PFPascal Frantz

Pascal Frantz

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Pascal Frantz has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Rules vs Principles Based Financial Regulation

    by Pascal Frantz, Norvald Instefjord

    We study the relative strengths and weaknesses of principles based and rules based systems of regulation. In the principles based systems there is clarity about


  • Open Access

    Financial Regulation: Regulatory Arbitrage and Regulatory Harmonization

    by Pascal Frantz, Norvald Instefjord

    This paper analyzes the problem of designing optimal financial regulation when regulatory arbitrage allows competition from other regulators, and whether regulatory harmonization as a means to curb regulatory arbitrage is desirable. We find (i) that regulatory arbitrage and competition matter in the sense that the optimal autarky approach to regulation may not be optimal in open economies; (ii) regulatory arbitrage that takes place in equilibrium is not as important as the possibility of regulatory arbitrage and the associated impact on regulatory competition; and (iii) regulatory diversity can be welfare optimal even though it leads to more regulatory arbitrage activity than regulatory harmonization.


  • Open Access

    Debt Overhang and Debt Restructuring

    by Pascal Frantz, Norvald Instefjord

    This paper analyzes how debt forgiveness and exchange offers resolve inefficiencies associated with debt overhang in a dynamic setting. In a static model debt forgiveness and exchange offers are equivalent -- in a dynamic model they are not. Debt forgiveness is feasible as a means to restructure debt when the firm expands into a competitive market, whereas exchange offers are necessary to eliminate the inefficiency of expansion into uncompetitive markets. We discuss the model in the light of existing empirical evidence and the empirical implications of the model.

  • Open Access

    Corporate Governance and the Cost of Borrowing

    by Pascal Frantz, Norvald Instefjord

    This paper analyzes the theoretical link between governance (defined loosely as the degree of protection offered to outside shareholders), and the cost of borrowing. We find, consistent with empirical evidence, that improvements in governance reduce the likelihood of default. Also, we find that improvements in governance will monotonically increase or reduce the cost of debt, where the sign of the relationship depends on the firm's restructuring cost in default. This finding can also rationalize existing empirical evidence within an optimal contracting argument for the use of debt.

  • Open Access

    Implications of Strategic Disclosure of Favourable News for Capital Markets Based Research

    by Pascal Frantz, Norvald Instefjord

    This paper derives the implications of strategic disclosure for the earnings-returns relation within a setting derived from Dye (1985), Jung and Kwon (1988), and Ohlson (1995), in which firms' managers disclose favourable earnings forecasts and withhold unfavourable earnings forecasts. It shows that such strategic disclosure by managers leads to concavity in the relation between contemporaneous reported accounting earnings and stock returns. This paper hence provide a new and intuitive explanation for the concavity in this relation reported in empirical studies.

  • Open Access

    Disclosure of Executive Compensation Contracts: An Economic Analysis

    by Pascal Frantz, Norvald Instefjord, Martin Walker

    Disclosure of executive compensation schemes has been made mandatory over the past decade in many countries including the UK and the US. Firms however tend not to fully disclose the functional form of their executive compensation schemes. This paper provides a rationale for the lack of voluntary disclosure by firms. It introduces a voluntary disclosure model in which executive compensation solves a moral hazard problem, the resolution of which depends on proprietary information. It provides conditions under which equilibria involving either disclosure or nondisclosure of the executive compensation scheme can obtain and shows that shareholders are better off precommitting not to disclose the executive compensation scheme whenever possible. It establishes that executive directors are better off too in the absence of disclosure of executive compensation schemes. It furthermore shows that mandating the disclosure of executive compensation may not increase the richness of investors' information set.