Alexandros Theloudis

This paper studies household labor supply, within the context of an inter-temporal collective model, and three prominent intra-household commitment regimes: full commitment, no commitment, and limited commitment. We propose a test that distinguishes among all three alternatives based on how contemporary and historical changes to the economic environment affect household behavior. We implement the test on recent data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics in the US (1999-2017). Although couples and singles behave similarly in many aspects, couples' labor supply exhibits distinctive features that are consistent with limited commitment. We then use our results to highlight several issues and caveats that arise when testing for commitment.

Spending time together with a spouse is a major gain from marriage. We extend the classical collective model of the household to allow for togetherness between spouses. Togetherness takes the form of joint leisure and joint care for children. Using revealed preferences conditions, we find that Dutch households are willing to pay €1.2 per hour - 10% of the average wage - to convert private leisure to joint, and €2.1 per hour to convert private childcare to joint. Our results suggest that togetherness is an important component of household time use despite it being overlooked in the economics literature.

This paper studies household labor supply, within the context of an intertemporal collective model, and three prominent intrahousehold commitment regimes: full commitment, no commitment, and limited commitment. We propose a test that distinguishes among all three alternatives based on how contemporary and historical changes to the economic environment affect household behavior. We implement the test on recent data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics in the US (1999-2017). Although couples and singles behave similarly in many aspects, couples' labor supply exhibits distinctive features that are consistent with limited commitment. We then use our results to highlight several issues and caveats that arise when testing for commitment.

This paper examines changes in married people's allocation of time since 1980, a period in which female labor supply increased substantially, men's share of household work rose, and the gender wage gap narrowed down. I develop a life-cycle collective household model for market and non-market work, consumption and asset accumulation, which also features lack of commitment to lifetime marriage. Wages in the model shift intra-family bargaining power and induce bargaining effects on outcomes in addition to standard income and substitution effects. I estimate gender-specific preferences and how intra-family bargaining power changes with a narrowing gender gap using data from the PSID. The results suggest that a narrowing gender gap improved women's bargaining power in the family resulting in a shift of household work to their husbands. It also contributed to the increase in female labor market participation. If the gender gap is counterfactually eliminated, the proportion of women in full-time work rises throughout the lifecycle to match approximately that of men. The increase comes from women who cut down household chores and enter the labor market when they previously did not participate.