Bohao Chu
Bohao Chu has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Bahadir Eryilmaz
University Hospital Essen, Institute for Artificial Intelligence in Medicine (IKIM), Girardetstraße 2, Essen, NRW, 45131, Germany
1 shared publication - Felix Nensa
Institute for Artificial Intelligence in Medicine, University Hospital Essen, Essen, Germany
1 shared publication - Hendrik Damm
Department of Computer Science, University of Applied Sciences and Arts Dortmund, Dortmund, NRW, Germany
1 shared publication - Jens Kleesiek
Technical University Dortmund
1 shared publication - Mikel Bahn
Institute for Artificial Intelligence in Medicine, University Hospital Essen, Essen, Germany
1 shared publication Noëlle Bender
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 10 August 2026
- Published by JMIR Publications Inc. in JMIR Preprints
Answer Disagreement Detects Unreliable Large Language Model Responses in Medical Question Answering, but Deliberate Prompting Does Not Prevent Them: A Pre-Registered Evaluation of Seven Open-Weight Models (Preprint)
BACKGROUND Large language models (LLMs) answering medical questions produce fluent but sometimes incorrect responses, and a clinically safe system must either avoid such errors or flag them. Deliberate multi-step prompting is widely proposed to prevent them, and sampling-based uncertainty estimation to detect them. Self-consistency prompting connects the two: it resamples a question several times, then discards the disagreement among those samples in favor of a majority vote. OBJECTIVE We tested whether deliberate prompting prevents unreliable answers, and whether the discarded disagreement detects them. METHODS We conducted a pre-registered computational evaluation (Open Science Framework) crossing 12 prompting techniques, organized on a System-1/System-2 dual-process ladder from direct answering to multi-pass verification, with 5 datasets and 7 open-weight LLMs at 10 random seeds per cell. Datasets were PubMedQA, MIMIC-IV-ED emergency-department disposition, LongHealth, BioASQ Task 13B, and MedHallu. All inference was local with models pinned by commit hash; no clinical text was sent to hosted application programming interfaces, as required by the PhysioNet Data Use Agreement. A separate pass resampled each question's zero-shot answer 10 times; we scored the entropy of the resulting answer distribution against correctness by area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUROC). Accuracy contrasts used a paired bootstrap (10,000 resamples) with Wilcoxon signed-rank tests and Holm-Bonferroni correction. RESULTS Deliberate prompting did not reliably improve accuracy. Of 176 corrected technique-versus-baseline contrasts across the 4 primary models, 52 were significantly better and 54 significantly worse; pooled bucket effects were +1.3 percentage points for single-pass System-2, −1.5 for multi-pass verification and −0.2 for integration, and the best technique added 2.9 points. The same 10-sample budget used for voting changed accuracy by +0.15 points, whereas the disagreement among those samples detected incorrect answers with AUROC 0.73 (95% CI 0.70–0.75; n=1559) on LongHealth, 0.69 (0.65–0.72; n=1040) on BioASQ, 0.58 (0.56–0.60; n=1990) on PubMedQA and 0.56 (0.53–0.58; n=1930) on MIMIC-IV-ED. Abstaining on the least confident half raised accuracy on the answered subset by 10.2, 10.3, 4.9 and 4.3 points respectively, each above a matched random-abstention baseline. Detectability tracked error arbitrariness: self-agreement for correct versus incorrect answers was 0.94 versus 0.77 on LongHealth but 0.83 versus 0.79 on MIMIC-IV-ED. An entailment-based estimator confirmed the free-text result (AUROC 0.692 entailment-based versus 0.686 rule-based). CONCLUSIONS In the open-weight, zero-shot, small-sample regime typical of local deployment, deliberate prompting is not a reliable safety lever, whereas the disagreement self-consistency discards is an informative and essentially free reliability signal. Its limitation is systematic: it detects arbitrary errors and is blind to confident, reproducible ones, the errors of greatest clinical concern. Sampling-based uncertainty should therefore serve as a triage filter, never as a certificate of correctness.
- 10 August 2026
- Published by JMIR Publications Inc. in JMIR Preprints
Open AccessAnswer Disagreement Detects Unreliable Large Language Model Responses in Medical Question Answering, but Deliberate Prompting Does Not Prevent Them: A Pre-Registered Evaluation of Seven Open-Weight Models (Preprint)
BACKGROUND Large language models (LLMs) answering medical questions produce fluent but sometimes incorrect responses, and a clinically safe system must either avoid such errors or flag them. Deliberate multi-step prompting is widely proposed to prevent them, and sampling-based uncertainty estimation to detect them. Self-consistency prompting connects the two: it resamples a question several times, then discards the disagreement among those samples in favor of a majority vote. OBJECTIVE We tested whether deliberate prompting prevents unreliable answers, and whether the discarded disagreement detects them. METHODS We conducted a pre-registered computational evaluation (Open Science Framework) crossing 12 prompting techniques, organized on a System-1/System-2 dual-process ladder from direct answering to multi-pass verification, with 5 datasets and 7 open-weight LLMs at 10 random seeds per cell. Datasets were PubMedQA, MIMIC-IV-ED emergency-department disposition, LongHealth, BioASQ Task 13B, and MedHallu. All inference was local with models pinned by commit hash; no clinical text was sent to hosted application programming interfaces, as required by the PhysioNet Data Use Agreement. A separate pass resampled each question's zero-shot answer 10 times; we scored the entropy of the resulting answer distribution against correctness by area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUROC). Accuracy contrasts used a paired bootstrap (10,000 resamples) with Wilcoxon signed-rank tests and Holm-Bonferroni correction. RESULTS Deliberate prompting did not reliably improve accuracy. Of 176 corrected technique-versus-baseline contrasts across the 4 primary models, 52 were significantly better and 54 significantly worse; pooled bucket effects were +1.3 percentage points for single-pass System-2, −1.5 for multi-pass verification and −0.2 for integration, and the best technique added 2.9 points. The same 10-sample budget used for voting changed accuracy by +0.15 points, whereas the disagreement among those samples detected incorrect answers with AUROC 0.73 (95% CI 0.70–0.75; n=1559) on LongHealth, 0.69 (0.65–0.72; n=1040) on BioASQ, 0.58 (0.56–0.60; n=1990) on PubMedQA and 0.56 (0.53–0.58; n=1930) on MIMIC-IV-ED. Abstaining on the least confident half raised accuracy on the answered subset by 10.2, 10.3, 4.9 and 4.3 points respectively, each above a matched random-abstention baseline. Detectability tracked error arbitrariness: self-agreement for correct versus incorrect answers was 0.94 versus 0.77 on LongHealth but 0.83 versus 0.79 on MIMIC-IV-ED. An entailment-based estimator confirmed the free-text result (AUROC 0.692 entailment-based versus 0.686 rule-based). CONCLUSIONS In the open-weight, zero-shot, small-sample regime typical of local deployment, deliberate prompting is not a reliable safety lever, whereas the disagreement self-consistency discards is an informative and essentially free reliability signal. Its limitation is systematic: it detects arbitrary errors and is blind to confident, reproducible ones, the errors of greatest clinical concern. Sampling-based uncertainty should therefore serve as a triage filter, never as a certificate of correctness.