Addo Stephen Tetteh
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Addo Stephen Tetteh has a total of 19 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Adwoa Ayewa Ayimadu
West African Centre for Cell Biology of Infectious Pathogens (WACCBIP), University of Ghana, Legon, Accra, Ghana
1 shared publication - Anjali Rathod
West African Centre for Cell Biology of Infectious Pathogens (WACCBIP), University of Ghana, Legon, Accra, Ghana
1 shared publication - Arnold Abakah
Kumasi Centre for Collaborative Research in Tropical Medicine Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology Kumasi Ghana
1 shared publication - Baakwa De-Graft Miah
West African Centre for Cell Biology of Infectious Pathogens (WACCBIP), University of Ghana, Legon, Accra, Ghana
1 shared publication - Daniel Baah
West African Centre for Cell Biology of Infectious Pathogens (WACCBIP), University of Ghana, Legon, Accra, Ghana
1 shared publication - Doreen Akakpo
West African Centre for Cell Biology of Infectious Pathogens (WACCBIP), University of Ghana, Legon, Accra, Ghana
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Policy-Enforced Genomic Repositories and Institutional Data Governance for African Pathogen Surveillance with UbuntuBio
Research centers curating pathogen sequence cohorts often operate under constrained bandwidth, multi-institutional data-sharing agreements, and strict biosafety requirements. Global public archives keep released sequences permanently open, external viral portals enforce terms outside local institutional custody, and standard Git Large File Storage (LFS) duplicates identical binaries across repositories without validating taxonomy or geography. We present UbuntuBio (v1.0.0), a Git-native, policy-enforced genomic repository platform deployed at https://ubuntubio.org and developed at the West African Centre for Cell Biology of Infectious Pathogens (WACCBIP), University of Ghana. UbuntuBio integrates four mechanisms under a single storage root: (1) bare Git repositories storing dataset cards, sample sheets, and approximately 130-byte LFS pointers backed by prefix-sharded SHA-256 content-addressed storage (CAS) with visibility-scoped wire deduplication; (2) a four-phase commit pipeline recoverable via cross-plane reconciliation that enforces 55 African Union country codes against offline Natural Earth polygons, core MIxS-derived fields, Taxon 9606 rejection, and server-keyed targeted human-marker screening identically across HTTP commits and Git pre-receive hooks; (3) institutional custody controls combining Data Use Agreements (DUAs), revocable 900-second RS256 capability tokens, key rotation, tamper-evident hash-chained logs, and externally anchorable RS256 audit checkpoints; and (4) an embedded SQLite WAL and FTS5 catalog filtered by access tier. In single-node evaluation, UbuntuBio classified 18/18 policy boundary fixtures consistently across Python, Git, and HTTP paths; showed 0/265,157 false cross-matches on 21/22 RefSeq pathogen sequences (while cross-matching Candida albicans 18S rDNA at 0.113% and Chlorocebus sabaeus Alu repeats in ENA stool reads, confirming targeted marker detection rather than verified human DNA decontamination); matched conditional uniform (n = 2,000; 200-seed 0.01% convergence 19.0% vs. 18.13% expected) and interior (n = 1,000) detection theory while detecting all spike-ins at ≥ 0.5% (30/30); halved two-repository disk usage on 613.83 MiB Nigerian E. coli runs; passed 27/27 structured-filter correctness checks over 10,000 biosamples and reached graded NDCG@10 = 0.920 on independent free-text BM25 queries with zero private leaks; and recovered cleanly across seven injected phase-transition faults.
Open AccessPolicy-Enforced Genomic Repositories and Institutional Data Governance for African Pathogen Surveillance with UbuntuBio
Research centers curating pathogen sequence cohorts often operate under constrained bandwidth, multi-institutional data-sharing agreements, and strict biosafety requirements. Global public archives keep released sequences permanently open, external viral portals enforce terms outside local institutional custody, and standard Git Large File Storage (LFS) duplicates identical binaries across repositories without validating taxonomy or geography. We present UbuntuBio (v1.0.0), a Git-native, policy-enforced genomic repository platform deployed at https://ubuntubio.org and developed at the West African Centre for Cell Biology of Infectious Pathogens (WACCBIP), University of Ghana. UbuntuBio integrates four mechanisms under a single storage root: (1) bare Git repositories storing dataset cards, sample sheets, and approximately 130-byte LFS pointers backed by prefix-sharded SHA-256 content-addressed storage (CAS) with visibility-scoped wire deduplication; (2) a four-phase commit pipeline recoverable via cross-plane reconciliation that enforces 55 African Union country codes against offline Natural Earth polygons, core MIxS-derived fields, Taxon 9606 rejection, and server-keyed targeted human-marker screening identically across HTTP commits and Git pre-receive hooks; (3) institutional custody controls combining Data Use Agreements (DUAs), revocable 900-second RS256 capability tokens, key rotation, tamper-evident hash-chained logs, and externally anchorable RS256 audit checkpoints; and (4) an embedded SQLite WAL and FTS5 catalog filtered by access tier. In single-node evaluation, UbuntuBio classified 18/18 policy boundary fixtures consistently across Python, Git, and HTTP paths; showed 0/265,157 false cross-matches on 21/22 RefSeq pathogen sequences (while cross-matching Candida albicans 18S rDNA at 0.113% and Chlorocebus sabaeus Alu repeats in ENA stool reads, confirming targeted marker detection rather than verified human DNA decontamination); matched conditional uniform (n = 2,000; 200-seed 0.01% convergence 19.0% vs. 18.13% expected) and interior (n = 1,000) detection theory while detecting all spike-ins at ≥ 0.5% (30/30); halved two-repository disk usage on 613.83 MiB Nigerian E. coli runs; passed 27/27 structured-filter correctness checks over 10,000 biosamples and reached graded NDCG@10 = 0.920 on independent free-text BM25 queries with zero private leaks; and recovered cleanly across seven injected phase-transition faults.