Bankruptcy Codes and Innovation
Authors:
- Viral V. AcharyaVAViral V. Acharya
- Krishnamurthy V. SubramanianKSKrishnamurthy V. Subramanian
Top Cited Papers
- 9 April 2009
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Financial Studies
- Vol. 22 (12) , 4949-4988
Abstract
We argue that when bankruptcy code is creditor friendly, excessive liquidations cause levered firms to shun innovation, whereas by promoting continuation upon failure, a debtor-friendly code induces greater innovation. We provide empirical support for this claim by employing patents as a proxy for innovation. Using time-series changes within a country and cross-country variation in creditor rights, we confirm that a creditor-friendly code leads to a lower absolute level of innovation by firms, as well as relatively lower innovation by firms in technologically innovative industries. When creditor rights are stronger, technologically innovative industries employ relatively less leverage and grow disproportionately slower.Keywords
This publication has 26 references indexed in Scilit:
- Bankruptcy Codes and InnovationThe Review of Financial Studies, 2009
- How Law Affects LendingSSRN Electronic Journal, 2008
- Creditor Rights and Corporate Risk-TakingSSRN Electronic Journal, 2008
- Private credit in 129 countries☆Journal of Financial Economics, 2007
- Do Firms Learn from International Trade?Review of Economics and Statistics, 2006
- Entrepreneurship and the Stigma of FailureSSRN Electronic Journal, 2005
- Personal Bankruptcy and the Level of Entrepreneurial ActivityThe Journal of Law and Economics, 2003
- A Statistical Analysis of Corporate Technological Leadership HistoricallyEconomics of Innovation and New Technology, 1996
- What Do We Know about Capital Structure? Some Evidence from International DataThe Journal of Finance, 1995
- A Model of Growth Through Creative DestructionEconometrica, 1992