Creditor Rights and Corporate Risk-Taking
Authors:
- Viral V. AcharyaVAViral V. Acharya
- Yakov AmihudYAYakov Amihud
- Lubomir P. LitovLLLubomir P. Litov
Preprint
- 1 January 2008
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
We propose that stronger creditor rights in bankruptcy reduce corporate risk-taking. Employing country-level data, we find that strong creditor rights are assocKeywords
All Related Versions
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