Breaking de Morgan's law in counterfactual antecedents
Open Access
- 15 October 2016
- journal article
- Published by Linguistic Society of America in Semantics and Linguistic Theory
- Vol. 26, 304-324
Abstract
The main goal of this paper is to investigate the relation between the meaning of a sentence and its truth conditions. We report on a comprehension experiment on counterfactual conditionals, based on a context in which a light is controlled by two switches. Our main finding is that the truth-conditionally equivalent clauses (i) switch A or switch B is down and (ii) switch A and switch B are not both up make different semantic contributions when embedded in a conditional antecedent. Assuming compositionality, this means that (i) and (ii) differ in meaning, which implies that the meaning of a sentential clause cannot be identified with its truth conditions. We show that our data have a clear explanation in inquisitive semantics: in a conditional antecedent, (i) introduces two distinct assumptions, while (ii) introduces only one. Independently of the complications stemming from disjunctive antecedents, our results also challenge analyses of counterfactuals in terms of minimal change from the actual state of affairs: we show that such analyses cannot account for our findings, regardless of what changes are considered minimal.Keywords
This publication has 15 references indexed in Scilit:
- A streamlined approach to online linguistic surveysNatural Language & Linguistic Theory, 2015
- Truth-Maker Semantics for Intuitionistic LogicJournal of Philosophical Logic, 2013
- Algebraic foundations for the semantic treatment of inquisitive contentSynthese, 2013
- Counterfactuals Without Possible WorldsThe Journal of Philosophy, 2012
- Counterfactuals, correlatives, and disjunctionLinguistics and Philosophy, 2009
- Making Counterfactual AssumptionsJournal of Semantics, 2005
- Frames in the space of situationsArtificial Intelligence, 1990
- Partition and revision: The semantics of counterfactualsJournal of Philosophical Logic, 1981
- Counterfactuals and the Similarity of WordsThe Journal of Philosophy, 1975
- A Theory of Conditionals1968