Lucas Champollion
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Lucas Champollion has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Linmin Zhang
NYU Shanghai
2 shared publications - Timothée Bernard
Université Paris Diderot
2 shared publications - Adrian Brasoveanu
Department of Linguistics, The University of California–Santa Cruz, High Street, Santa Cruz, CA, USA
1 shared publication - Anna Alsop
New York University
1 shared publication Anna Szabolcsi
New York University
1 shared publication- Aravind K. Joshi
University of Pennsylvania
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 16 November 2024
- Published by Wiley in Language and Linguistics Compass
- Vol. 19 (1)
Truthmaker Semantics and Natural Language Semantics
Truthmaker semantics is a non‐classical logical framework that has recently garnered significant interest in philosophy, logic, and natural language semantics. It redefines the propositional connectives and gives rise to more fine‐grained entailment relations than classical logic. In its model theory, truth is not determined with respect to possible worlds, but with respect to truthmakers, such as states or events. Unlike possible worlds, these truthmakers may be partial; they may be either coherent or incoherent; and they are understood to be exactly or wholly relevant to the truth of the sentences they verify. Truthmaker semantics generalises collective, fusion‐based theories of conjunction; alternative‐based theories of disjunction; and nonstandard negation semantics. This article provides a gentle introduction to truthmaker semantics aimed at linguists; describes applications to various natural language phenomena such as imperatives, ignorance implicatures, and negative events; and discusses its similarities and differences to related frameworks such as event semantics, situation semantics, alternative semantics, and inquisitive semantics.
- 16 November 2024
- Published by Wiley in Language and Linguistics Compass
- Vol. 19 (1)
Open AccessTruthmaker Semantics and Natural Language Semantics
Truthmaker semantics is a non‐classical logical framework that has recently garnered significant interest in philosophy, logic, and natural language semantics. It redefines the propositional connectives and gives rise to more fine‐grained entailment relations than classical logic. In its model theory, truth is not determined with respect to possible worlds, but with respect to truthmakers, such as states or events. Unlike possible worlds, these truthmakers may be partial; they may be either coherent or incoherent; and they are understood to be exactly or wholly relevant to the truth of the sentences they verify. Truthmaker semantics generalises collective, fusion‐based theories of conjunction; alternative‐based theories of disjunction; and nonstandard negation semantics. This article provides a gentle introduction to truthmaker semantics aimed at linguists; describes applications to various natural language phenomena such as imperatives, ignorance implicatures, and negative events; and discusses its similarities and differences to related frameworks such as event semantics, situation semantics, alternative semantics, and inquisitive semantics.
- 2 August 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Linguistics and Philosophy
- Vol. 47 (4) , 517-555
Negation and modality in unilateral truthmaker semantics
- 2 August 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Linguistics and Philosophy
- Vol. 47 (4) , 517-555
Negation and modality in unilateral truthmaker semantics
- Open Access
- 9 December 2019
- Published by Linguistic Society of America in Semantics and Linguistic Theory
- Vol. 29, 238-257
Free choice disjunction as a rational speech act
The so-called free choice inference (from You may take an apple or a pear to You may take an apple) is mysterious because it does not follow from ordinary modal logic. We show that this inference arises in the Rational Speech Act framework (Frank & Goodman 2012). Our basic idea is inspired by exhaustification-based models of free choice (Fox 2007) and by game-theoretic accounts based on iterated best response (Franke 2011). We assume that when the speaker utters You may take an apple or a pear, the hearer reasons about why the speaker did not choose alternative utterances such as You may take an apple. A crucial ingredient in our explanation is the idea of semantic uncertainty (Bergen, Levy & Goodman 2016). Specifically, we assume that the speaker is uncertain whether or not the hearer will interpret You may take an apple as forbidding them from taking a pear. This uncertainty can be thought of as resulting from Fox’s (2007) optional covert exhaustification. Uttering the disjunction is a way for the speaker to prevent the hearer from concluding that any fruit is forbidden to take. Knowing this, the hearer concludes that they may choose either fruit.
- 9 December 2019
- Published by Linguistic Society of America in Semantics and Linguistic Theory
- Vol. 29, 238-257
Open AccessFree choice disjunction as a rational speech act
The so-called free choice inference (from You may take an apple or a pear to You may take an apple) is mysterious because it does not follow from ordinary modal logic. We show that this inference arises in the Rational Speech Act framework (Frank & Goodman 2012). Our basic idea is inspired by exhaustification-based models of free choice (Fox 2007) and by game-theoretic accounts based on iterated best response (Franke 2011). We assume that when the speaker utters You may take an apple or a pear, the hearer reasons about why the speaker did not choose alternative utterances such as You may take an apple. A crucial ingredient in our explanation is the idea of semantic uncertainty (Bergen, Levy & Goodman 2016). Specifically, we assume that the speaker is uncertain whether or not the hearer will interpret You may take an apple as forbidding them from taking a pear. This uncertainty can be thought of as resulting from Fox’s (2007) optional covert exhaustification. Uttering the disjunction is a way for the speaker to prevent the hearer from concluding that any fruit is forbidden to take. Knowing this, the hearer concludes that they may choose either fruit.
- Open Access
- 15 November 2019
- Published by Linguistic Society of America in Semantics and Pragmatics
- Vol. 12 (1) , 1-51
Donkeys under discussion
Donkey sentences have existential and universal readings, but they are not often perceived as ambiguous. We extend the pragmatic theory of non-maximality in plural definites by Križ (2016) to explain how hearers use Questions under Discussion to fix the interpretation of donkey sentences in context. We propose that the denotations of such sentences involve truth-value gaps — in certain scenarios the sentences are neither true nor false — and demonstrate that Križ’s pragmatic theory fills these gaps to generate the standard judgments of the literature. Building on Muskens’s (1996) Compositional Discourse Representation Theory and on ideas from supervaluation semantics, we define a general schema for dynamic quantification that delivers the required truth-value gaps. Given the independently motivated pragmatic theory of Križ 2016, we argue that mixed readings of donkey sentences require neither plural information states, contra Brasoveanu 2008, 2010, nor error states, contra Champollion 2016, nor singular donkey pronouns with plural referents, contra Krifka 1996, Yoon 1996. We also show that the pragmatic account improves over alternatives like Kanazawa 1994 that attribute the readings of donkey sentences to the monotonicity properties of the embedding quantifier. EARLY ACCESS
- 15 November 2019
- Published by Linguistic Society of America in Semantics and Pragmatics
- Vol. 12 (1) , 1-51
Open AccessDonkeys under discussion
Donkey sentences have existential and universal readings, but they are not often perceived as ambiguous. We extend the pragmatic theory of non-maximality in plural definites by Križ (2016) to explain how hearers use Questions under Discussion to fix the interpretation of donkey sentences in context. We propose that the denotations of such sentences involve truth-value gaps — in certain scenarios the sentences are neither true nor false — and demonstrate that Križ’s pragmatic theory fills these gaps to generate the standard judgments of the literature. Building on Muskens’s (1996) Compositional Discourse Representation Theory and on ideas from supervaluation semantics, we define a general schema for dynamic quantification that delivers the required truth-value gaps. Given the independently motivated pragmatic theory of Križ 2016, we argue that mixed readings of donkey sentences require neither plural information states, contra Brasoveanu 2008, 2010, nor error states, contra Champollion 2016, nor singular donkey pronouns with plural referents, contra Krifka 1996, Yoon 1996. We also show that the pragmatic account improves over alternatives like Kanazawa 1994 that attribute the readings of donkey sentences to the monotonicity properties of the embedding quantifier. EARLY ACCESS
- 14 January 2019
- Published by Annual Reviews in Annual Review of Linguistics
- Vol. 5 (1) , 289-308
Distributivity in Formal Semantics
Distributivity in natural language occurs in sentences such as John and Mary (each) took a deep breath, when a predicate that is combined with a plurality-denoting expression is understood as holding of each of the members of that plurality. Language provides ways to express distributivity overtly, with words such as English each, but also covertly, when no one word can be regarded as contributing it. Both overt and covert distributivity occur in a wide variety of constructions. This article reviews and synthesizes influential approaches to distributivity in formal semantics and includes pointers to some more recent approaches. Theories of distributivity can be distinguished on the basis of how they answer a number of interrelated questions: To what extent can distributivity be attributed to what we know about the world, as opposed to the meanings of words or silent operators? What is the relationship between distributivity and plurality? Does distributivity always reach down to the singular individuals in a plurality? If not, under what circumstances is distributivity over subgroups possible, and what is its relation to distributivity over individuals?
- 14 January 2019
- Published by Annual Reviews in Annual Review of Linguistics
- Vol. 5 (1) , 289-308
Distributivity in Formal Semantics
Distributivity in natural language occurs in sentences such as John and Mary (each) took a deep breath, when a predicate that is combined with a plurality-denoting expression is understood as holding of each of the members of that plurality. Language provides ways to express distributivity overtly, with words such as English each, but also covertly, when no one word can be regarded as contributing it. Both overt and covert distributivity occur in a wide variety of constructions. This article reviews and synthesizes influential approaches to distributivity in formal semantics and includes pointers to some more recent approaches. Theories of distributivity can be distinguished on the basis of how they answer a number of interrelated questions: To what extent can distributivity be attributed to what we know about the world, as opposed to the meanings of words or silent operators? What is the relationship between distributivity and plurality? Does distributivity always reach down to the singular individuals in a plurality? If not, under what circumstances is distributivity over subgroups possible, and what is its relation to distributivity over individuals?
- Open Access
- 27 November 2018
- Published by Linguistic Society of America in Semantics and Linguistic Theory
- Vol. 28, 512-532
Negative events in compositional semantics
Negative events have been used in analyses of various natural language phenomena such as negative perception reports and negative causation, but their conceptual and logical foundations remain ill-understood. We propose that linguistic negation denotes a function Neg, which sends any set of events P to a set Neg(P) that contains all events which preclude every event in P from being actual. An axiom ensures that any event in Neg(P) is actual if and only if no event in P is. This allows us to construe the events in Neg(P) as negative, "anti-P", events. We present a syntax-semantics interface that uses continuations to resolve scope mismatches between subject and verb phrase negation, and a fragment of English that accounts for the interaction of negation, the perception verb see, finite and nonfinite perception reports, and quantified subjects, as well as negative causation.
- 27 November 2018
- Published by Linguistic Society of America in Semantics and Linguistic Theory
- Vol. 28, 512-532
Open AccessNegative events in compositional semantics
Negative events have been used in analyses of various natural language phenomena such as negative perception reports and negative causation, but their conceptual and logical foundations remain ill-understood. We propose that linguistic negation denotes a function Neg, which sends any set of events P to a set Neg(P) that contains all events which preclude every event in P from being actual. An axiom ensures that any event in Neg(P) is actual if and only if no event in P is. This allows us to construe the events in Neg(P) as negative, "anti-P", events. We present a syntax-semantics interface that uses continuations to resolve scope mismatches between subject and verb phrase negation, and a fragment of English that accounts for the interaction of negation, the perception verb see, finite and nonfinite perception reports, and quantified subjects, as well as negative causation.
- Open Access
- 15 June 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Linguistics and Philosophy
- Vol. 41 (6) , 577-621
Two switches in the theory of counterfactuals
- 15 June 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Linguistics and Philosophy
- Vol. 41 (6) , 577-621
Open AccessTwo switches in the theory of counterfactuals
- Open Access
- 22 October 2017
- Published by Linguistic Society of America in Semantics and Linguistic Theory
- Vol. 27, 418-437
Rigid and Flexible Quantification in Plural Predicate Logic
Noun phrases with overt determiners, such as some apples or a quantity of milk, differ from bare noun phrases like apples or milk in their contribution to aspectual composition. While this has been attributed to syntactic or algebraic properties of these noun phrases, such accounts have explanatory shortcomings. We suggest instead that the relevant property that distinguishes between the two classes of noun phrases derives from two modes of existential quantification, one of which holds the values of a variable fixed throughout a quantificational context while the other allows them to vary. Inspired by Dynamic Plural Logic and Dependence Logic, we propose Plural Predicate Logic as an extension of Predicate Logic to formalize this difference. We suggest that temporal for-adverbials are sensitive to aspect because of the way they manipulate quantificational contexts, and that analogous manipulations occur with spatial for-adverbials, habituals, and the quantifier all.
- 22 October 2017
- Published by Linguistic Society of America in Semantics and Linguistic Theory
- Vol. 27, 418-437
Open AccessRigid and Flexible Quantification in Plural Predicate Logic
Noun phrases with overt determiners, such as some apples or a quantity of milk, differ from bare noun phrases like apples or milk in their contribution to aspectual composition. While this has been attributed to syntactic or algebraic properties of these noun phrases, such accounts have explanatory shortcomings. We suggest instead that the relevant property that distinguishes between the two classes of noun phrases derives from two modes of existential quantification, one of which holds the values of a variable fixed throughout a quantificational context while the other allows them to vary. Inspired by Dynamic Plural Logic and Dependence Logic, we propose Plural Predicate Logic as an extension of Predicate Logic to formalize this difference. We suggest that temporal for-adverbials are sensitive to aspect because of the way they manipulate quantificational contexts, and that analogous manipulations occur with spatial for-adverbials, habituals, and the quantifier all.
- Open Access
- 15 October 2016
- Published by Linguistic Society of America in Semantics and Linguistic Theory
- Vol. 26, 304-324
Breaking de Morgan's law in counterfactual antecedents
The main goal of this paper is to investigate the relation between the meaning of a sentence and its truth conditions. We report on a comprehension experiment on counterfactual conditionals, based on a context in which a light is controlled by two switches. Our main finding is that the truth-conditionally equivalent clauses (i) switch A or switch B is down and (ii) switch A and switch B are not both up make different semantic contributions when embedded in a conditional antecedent. Assuming compositionality, this means that (i) and (ii) differ in meaning, which implies that the meaning of a sentential clause cannot be identified with its truth conditions. We show that our data have a clear explanation in inquisitive semantics: in a conditional antecedent, (i) introduces two distinct assumptions, while (ii) introduces only one. Independently of the complications stemming from disjunctive antecedents, our results also challenge analyses of counterfactuals in terms of minimal change from the actual state of affairs: we show that such analyses cannot account for our findings, regardless of what changes are considered minimal.
- 15 October 2016
- Published by Linguistic Society of America in Semantics and Linguistic Theory
- Vol. 26, 304-324
Open AccessBreaking de Morgan's law in counterfactual antecedents
The main goal of this paper is to investigate the relation between the meaning of a sentence and its truth conditions. We report on a comprehension experiment on counterfactual conditionals, based on a context in which a light is controlled by two switches. Our main finding is that the truth-conditionally equivalent clauses (i) switch A or switch B is down and (ii) switch A and switch B are not both up make different semantic contributions when embedded in a conditional antecedent. Assuming compositionality, this means that (i) and (ii) differ in meaning, which implies that the meaning of a sentential clause cannot be identified with its truth conditions. We show that our data have a clear explanation in inquisitive semantics: in a conditional antecedent, (i) introduces two distinct assumptions, while (ii) introduces only one. Independently of the complications stemming from disjunctive antecedents, our results also challenge analyses of counterfactuals in terms of minimal change from the actual state of affairs: we show that such analyses cannot account for our findings, regardless of what changes are considered minimal.
- Open Access
- 3 June 2016
- Published by Linguistic Society of America in Semantics and Pragmatics
- Vol. 9
Overt distributivity in algebraic event semantics
Overt distributivity in algebraic event semantics
- 3 June 2016
- Published by Linguistic Society of America in Semantics and Pragmatics
- Vol. 9
Open AccessOvert distributivity in algebraic event semantics
Overt distributivity in algebraic event semantics