Private Provision of a Discrete Public Good: Continuous‐Strategy Equilibria in the Private‐Information Subscription Game
- 9 July 2008
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 10 (4) , 529-545
Abstract
We reconsider Laussel and Palfrey's analysis of private provision of discrete public goods via the subscription game. We show their semi‐regular equilibria do not exist, casting doubt on their efficiency analysis. Taking players' values for the public good as uniformly distributed on , we exhibit previously unrecognized continuous equilibria—those with contribution strategies strictly increasing up to their maximum values, not necessarily equal to the provision cost, c, at which point they become flat. We show piecewise‐linear equilibria are not incentive efficient; and if and , then all symmetric equilibria are interim incentive inefficient.Keywords
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