Entry Deterrence and Signaling in a Nonrenewable Resource Model
Authors:
- Stephen PolaskySPStephen Polasky
- Okmyung BinOBOkmyung Bin
- 1 November 2001
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
- Vol. 42 (3) , 235-256
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 10 references indexed in Scilit:
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