Strategic Preemption in a Common Property Resource: A Continuous Time Approach
- 1 November 2002
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 23 (3) , 255-278
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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