An Analysis of Turing’s Criterion for ‘Thinking’
Open Access
- 3 November 2022
- journal article
- research article
- Published by MDPI AG in Philosophies
- Vol. 7 (6) , 124
Abstract
In this paper I argue that Turing proposed a new approach to the concept of thinking, based on his claim that intelligence is an ‘emotional concept’; and that the response-dependence interpretation of Turing’s ‘criterion for “thinking”’ is a better fit with his writings than orthodox interpretations. The aim of this paper is to clarify the response-dependence interpretation, by addressing such questions as: What did Turing mean by the expression ‘emotional’? Is Turing’s criterion subjective? Are ‘emotional’ judgements decided by social consensus? Turing’s take on these issues impacts current philosophical debates on response-dependent concepts and on the nature of artificial intelligence.Keywords
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