Diane Proudfoot
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Diane Proudfoot has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Christoph Bartneck
University of Canterbury
3 shared publications - Jack Copeland
Philosophy Department, University of Canterbury, New Zealand
2 shared publications - Sharon Temtsin
University of Canterbury
2 shared publications - B. Jack Copeland
University of Canterbury
1 shared publication - B. Jack Copeland
Philosophy Department, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand
1 shared publication - Jakub Złotowski
University of Canterbury
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 14 October 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- p. 1-20
Why No One Has Implemented the Turing Test: Identifying Turing’s Design and Putting it into Practice
In October 1950, Alan Turing proposed that a machine’s success in an imitation game provides a criterion for thinking. Turing’s test became one of the philosophical foundations of AI, but three-quarters of a century later, it is widely claimed that generative AI models pass the test, rendering it obsolete. Our aim here is to establish definitively Turing’s conceptual design for his game. We argue that influential interpretations of Turing’s design are mistaken, with the consequence that his test has not been passed. We also present the results of carrying out, for the first time, Turing’s experiment as he proposed it.
- 14 October 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- p. 1-20
Open AccessWhy No One Has Implemented the Turing Test: Identifying Turing’s Design and Putting it into Practice
In October 1950, Alan Turing proposed that a machine’s success in an imitation game provides a criterion for thinking. Turing’s test became one of the philosophical foundations of AI, but three-quarters of a century later, it is widely claimed that generative AI models pass the test, rendering it obsolete. Our aim here is to establish definitively Turing’s conceptual design for his game. We argue that influential interpretations of Turing’s design are mistaken, with the consequence that his test has not been passed. We also present the results of carrying out, for the first time, Turing’s experiment as he proposed it.
- 25 November 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophy & Technology
- Vol. 37 (4) , 1-14
Turing’s Test vs the Moral Turing Test
- 25 November 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophy & Technology
- Vol. 37 (4) , 1-14
Turing’s Test vs the Moral Turing Test
- Open Access
- 7 February 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 201 (2) , 1-2
Correction to: On Alan Turing's anticipation of connectionism
- 7 February 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 201 (2) , 1-2
Open AccessCorrection to: On Alan Turing's anticipation of connectionism
- Open Access
- 5 December 2022
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 250-252
A Bona Fide Turing Test
The constantly rising demand for human-like conversational agents and the accelerated development of natural language processing technology raise expectations for a breakthrough in intelligent machine research and development. However, measuring intelligence is impossible without a proper test. Alan Turing proposed a test for machine intelligence based on imitation and unconstrained conversations between a machine and a human. To the best of our knowledge, no one has ever conducted Turing’s test as Turing prescribed, even though the Turing Test has been a bone of contention for more than seventy years. Conducting a bona fide Turing Test will contribute to machine intelligence evaluation research and has the potential to advance AI researchers in their ultimate quest, developing an intelligent machine.
- 5 December 2022
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 250-252
Open AccessA Bona Fide Turing Test
The constantly rising demand for human-like conversational agents and the accelerated development of natural language processing technology raise expectations for a breakthrough in intelligent machine research and development. However, measuring intelligence is impossible without a proper test. Alan Turing proposed a test for machine intelligence based on imitation and unconstrained conversations between a machine and a human. To the best of our knowledge, no one has ever conducted Turing’s test as Turing prescribed, even though the Turing Test has been a bone of contention for more than seventy years. Conducting a bona fide Turing Test will contribute to machine intelligence evaluation research and has the potential to advance AI researchers in their ultimate quest, developing an intelligent machine.
- Open Access
- 3 November 2022
- Published by MDPI AG in Philosophies
- Vol. 7 (6) , 124
An Analysis of Turing’s Criterion for ‘Thinking’
In this paper I argue that Turing proposed a new approach to the concept of thinking, based on his claim that intelligence is an ‘emotional concept’; and that the response-dependence interpretation of Turing’s ‘criterion for “thinking”’ is a better fit with his writings than orthodox interpretations. The aim of this paper is to clarify the response-dependence interpretation, by addressing such questions as: What did Turing mean by the expression ‘emotional’? Is Turing’s criterion subjective? Are ‘emotional’ judgements decided by social consensus? Turing’s take on these issues impacts current philosophical debates on response-dependent concepts and on the nature of artificial intelligence.
- 3 November 2022
- Published by MDPI AG in Philosophies
- Vol. 7 (6) , 124
Open AccessAn Analysis of Turing’s Criterion for ‘Thinking’
In this paper I argue that Turing proposed a new approach to the concept of thinking, based on his claim that intelligence is an ‘emotional concept’; and that the response-dependence interpretation of Turing’s ‘criterion for “thinking”’ is a better fit with his writings than orthodox interpretations. The aim of this paper is to clarify the response-dependence interpretation, by addressing such questions as: What did Turing mean by the expression ‘emotional’? Is Turing’s criterion subjective? Are ‘emotional’ judgements decided by social consensus? Turing’s take on these issues impacts current philosophical debates on response-dependent concepts and on the nature of artificial intelligence.
- 27 August 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Minds and Machines
- Vol. 30 (4) , 487-512
Rethinking Turing’s Test and the Philosophical Implications
- 27 August 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Minds and Machines
- Vol. 30 (4) , 487-512
Rethinking Turing’s Test and the Philosophical Implications
- Open Access
- 31 May 2017
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 305-321
Turing and Free Will: A New Take on an Old Debate
In 1948 Turing claimed that the concept of intelligence is an “emotional concept”. An emotional concept is a response-dependent concept and Turing’s remarks in his 1948 and 1952 papers suggest a response-dependence approach to the concept of intelligence. On this view, whether or not an object is intelligent is determined, as Turing said, “as much by our own state of mind and training as by the properties of the object”. His discussion of free will suggests a similar approach. Turing said, for example, that if a machine’s program “results in its doing something interesting which we had not anticipated I should be inclined to say that the machine had originated something”. This points to a new form of free will compatibilism, which I call response-dependence compatibilism and explore here.
- 31 May 2017
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 305-321
Open AccessTuring and Free Will: A New Take on an Old Debate
In 1948 Turing claimed that the concept of intelligence is an “emotional concept”. An emotional concept is a response-dependent concept and Turing’s remarks in his 1948 and 1952 papers suggest a response-dependence approach to the concept of intelligence. On this view, whether or not an object is intelligent is determined, as Turing said, “as much by our own state of mind and training as by the properties of the object”. His discussion of free will suggests a similar approach. Turing said, for example, that if a machine’s program “results in its doing something interesting which we had not anticipated I should be inclined to say that the machine had originated something”. This points to a new form of free will compatibilism, which I call response-dependence compatibilism and explore here.
- 15 January 2016
- Published by Wiley in Metaphilosophy
- Vol. 47 (1) , 147-153
Heavenly Computation: Digital Metaphysics and the New Theology
- 15 January 2016
- Published by Wiley in Metaphilosophy
- Vol. 47 (1) , 147-153
Heavenly Computation: Digital Metaphysics and the New Theology
- Top Cited Papers
- 9 November 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Social Robotics
- Vol. 7 (3) , 347-360
Anthropomorphism: Opportunities and Challenges in Human–Robot Interaction
- 9 November 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Social Robotics
- Vol. 7 (3) , 347-360
Top Cited PapersAnthropomorphism: Opportunities and Challenges in Human–Robot Interaction