The Impact of Firm Prestige on Executive Compensation
Authors:
- Florens FockeFFFlorens Focke
- Ernst MaugEMErnst Maug
- Alexandra Niessen-RuenziANAlexandra Niessen-Ruenzi
Preprint
- 1 March 2012
- preprint
- Published by European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Abstract
We show that CEOs of prestigious firms earn less. Total compensation is on average 8% lower for firms listed in Fortune's ranking of America's most admired companies. We suggest that CEOs are willing to trade off status and career benefits from working for a publicly admired company against additional monetary compensation. Our identification strategy is based on matched sample analyses, difference-in-differences regressions, and a regression discontinuity design. We perform several robustness checks and exclude many alternative explanations, including that firm prestige just proxies for better corporate governance, or for increased exposure of the pay-setting process to media attention.Keywords
All Related Versions
- Published version: Journal of Financial Economics, 123 (2), 313.