The impact of firm prestige on executive compensation
Authors:
- Florens FockeFFFlorens Focke
- Ernst MaugEMErnst Maug
- Alexandra Niessen-RuenziANAlexandra Niessen-Ruenzi
- 1 February 2017
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Economics
- Vol. 123 (2) , 313-336
Abstract
No abstract availableAll Related Versions
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