The competition–innovation debate: is R&D cooperation the answer?
Authors:
- 1 March 2013
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Economics of Innovation and New Technology
- Vol. 22 (2) , 153-176
Abstract
Firms’ investment in research and development (R&D) depends on both product market competition and R&D cooperation. In this paper, we use a simple duopoly model of product innovation to show that firms should choose to enter into different cooperative R&D arrangements depending on competition. Equilibrium behavior implies different competition–innovation relationships conditional on the nature of the cooperative arrangements that firms join. Therefore, variation in the set of feasible modes of cooperation may explain why different competition–innovation relationships are observed in empirical studies based on field data. Experimental evidence confirms the presence of similar incentives for cooperating despite some deviations from predicted values of R&D.Keywords
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