Endogenous timing and income inequality in the voluntary provision of public goods: Theory and experiment
Authors:
- 16 August 2023
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique
- Vol. 56 (4) , 1347-1376
Abstract
This study theoretically and experimentally investigates the effects of income inequality on donors' decisions regarding timing choices and contributions to public goods when contribution timing is endogenously chosen by contributors. To this end, we use the conventional voluntary provision models of Warr (1983) and Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986), with Cobb–Douglas preferences augmented with a two‐stage game of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). The following results were obtained and experimentally confirmed. First, when the distribution of income is extremely unequal, donors are indifferent between the simultaneous and sequential moves in the contribution game. Second, as income inequality is decreased, the simultaneous‐move contribution game is likely to emerge because every donor prefers to act as a leader. Nevertheless, a higher‐income donor may also prefer to act as a follower without specific social preferences and uncertainty regarding the quality of public goods. Third, most theoretical predictions regarding timing decisions are supported in our laboratory experiment, provided that the participants had enough time to learn the consequences of their timing choices.Keywords
This publication has 21 references indexed in Scilit:
- Endogenous Move Structure and Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Theory and ExperimentJournal of Public Economic Theory, 2011
- Checkmate: Exploring Backward Induction among Chess PlayersAmerican Economic Review, 2011
- Leadership in Public Good Provision: A Timing Game PerspectiveJournal of Public Economic Theory, 2010
- After you—endogenous sequencing in voluntary contribution gamesJournal of Public Economics, 2005
- The impact of endowment heterogeneity and origin on public good contributions: evidence from the labJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2005
- A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and CooperationThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1999
- The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods under Varying Income DistributionsCanadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, 1996
- Sequential contributions to public goodsJournal of Public Economics, 1994
- COMMUNICATION and FREE‐RIDING BEHAVIOR: THE VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION MECHANISMEconomic Inquiry, 1988
- The private provision of a public good is independent of the distribution of incomeEconomics Letters, 1983