Jun‐Ichi Itaya
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Jun‐Ichi Itaya has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Atsue Mizushima
Faculty of Economics Osaka University of Economics Osaka Japan
2 shared publications- Chikara Yamaguchi
Hiroshima Shudo University
1 shared publication Gareth Myles
Retired Dartmouth UK
1 shared publicationKengo Kurosaka
Faculty of Economic Sciences Hiroshima Shudo University
1 shared publication- Kenichi Kurita
Kyushu University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 25 March 2025
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 27 (2)
Does Equal Income Maximize Social Welfare When Multiple Pure Public Goods Are Privately Provided?
This paper analyzes the relationship between income distribution and social welfare when multiple pure public goods are privately provided. With a single public good and identical preferences, an increase in income inequality raises social welfare when it reduces the set of contributors so equality cannot be social optimal. We explore how this result is modified when there are multiple privately‐provided public goods. It is shown that regions of neutrality alternate with regions of non‐neutrality as income distribution is varied. In particular, in the setting of multiple privately‐supplied public goods with non‐idential preferences a region of non‐neutrality emerges when individuals contribute to different public goods or when only one individual contributes. Moreover, social welfare will always be maximized by an income distribution located in a region of non‐neutrality. This result implies that social welfare has local maxima at income distributions with inequality as well as around the equal income distribution. We also explore how the optimal extent of inequality is dependent on preference parameters.
- 25 March 2025
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 27 (2)
Does Equal Income Maximize Social Welfare When Multiple Pure Public Goods Are Privately Provided?
This paper analyzes the relationship between income distribution and social welfare when multiple pure public goods are privately provided. With a single public good and identical preferences, an increase in income inequality raises social welfare when it reduces the set of contributors so equality cannot be social optimal. We explore how this result is modified when there are multiple privately‐provided public goods. It is shown that regions of neutrality alternate with regions of non‐neutrality as income distribution is varied. In particular, in the setting of multiple privately‐supplied public goods with non‐idential preferences a region of non‐neutrality emerges when individuals contribute to different public goods or when only one individual contributes. Moreover, social welfare will always be maximized by an income distribution located in a region of non‐neutrality. This result implies that social welfare has local maxima at income distributions with inequality as well as around the equal income distribution. We also explore how the optimal extent of inequality is dependent on preference parameters.
- 24 February 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Population Economics
- Vol. 37 (1) , 1-28
Population dynamics of welfare stigma: welfare fraud versus incomplete take-up
- 24 February 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Population Economics
- Vol. 37 (1) , 1-28
Population dynamics of welfare stigma: welfare fraud versus incomplete take-up
- 16 August 2023
- Published by Wiley in Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique
- Vol. 56 (4) , 1347-1376
Endogenous timing and income inequality in the voluntary provision of public goods: Theory and experiment
This study theoretically and experimentally investigates the effects of income inequality on donors' decisions regarding timing choices and contributions to public goods when contribution timing is endogenously chosen by contributors. To this end, we use the conventional voluntary provision models of Warr (1983) and Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986), with Cobb–Douglas preferences augmented with a two‐stage game of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). The following results were obtained and experimentally confirmed. First, when the distribution of income is extremely unequal, donors are indifferent between the simultaneous and sequential moves in the contribution game. Second, as income inequality is decreased, the simultaneous‐move contribution game is likely to emerge because every donor prefers to act as a leader. Nevertheless, a higher‐income donor may also prefer to act as a follower without specific social preferences and uncertainty regarding the quality of public goods. Third, most theoretical predictions regarding timing decisions are supported in our laboratory experiment, provided that the participants had enough time to learn the consequences of their timing choices.
- 16 August 2023
- Published by Wiley in Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique
- Vol. 56 (4) , 1347-1376
Endogenous timing and income inequality in the voluntary provision of public goods: Theory and experiment
This study theoretically and experimentally investigates the effects of income inequality on donors' decisions regarding timing choices and contributions to public goods when contribution timing is endogenously chosen by contributors. To this end, we use the conventional voluntary provision models of Warr (1983) and Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986), with Cobb–Douglas preferences augmented with a two‐stage game of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). The following results were obtained and experimentally confirmed. First, when the distribution of income is extremely unequal, donors are indifferent between the simultaneous and sequential moves in the contribution game. Second, as income inequality is decreased, the simultaneous‐move contribution game is likely to emerge because every donor prefers to act as a leader. Nevertheless, a higher‐income donor may also prefer to act as a follower without specific social preferences and uncertainty regarding the quality of public goods. Third, most theoretical predictions regarding timing decisions are supported in our laboratory experiment, provided that the participants had enough time to learn the consequences of their timing choices.
- 12 October 2022
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 25 (2) , 276-300
Endogenous leadership and sustainability of enhanced cooperation in a repeated interactions model of tax competition: Endogenous leadership in tax competition
In this study, the endogenous timing of moves is analyzed in an infinitely repeated game setting of capital tax competition between a subgroup (a tax union) of countries agreeing on partial tax harmonization and outside countries. It is shown that in a subgame perfect equilibrium of the infinitely repeated tax competition game, they simultaneously set capital taxes in every stage game when a tax union comprises similar countries with respect to productivity, whereas they may set capital taxes sequentially in every stage game when a tax union comprises dissimilar countries. This finding is significantly different from Ogawa (2013), although we also assume that capital is owned by the country's residents, as in Ogawa's model. This is because a disadvantaged member country of the tax union would suffer from larger losses when a tax union comprising dissimilar countries, and thus the tax union will choose the strategy of moving Late for the sake of sustaining tax harmonization to avoid such losses.
- 12 October 2022
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 25 (2) , 276-300
Endogenous leadership and sustainability of enhanced cooperation in a repeated interactions model of tax competition: Endogenous leadership in tax competition
In this study, the endogenous timing of moves is analyzed in an infinitely repeated game setting of capital tax competition between a subgroup (a tax union) of countries agreeing on partial tax harmonization and outside countries. It is shown that in a subgame perfect equilibrium of the infinitely repeated tax competition game, they simultaneously set capital taxes in every stage game when a tax union comprises similar countries with respect to productivity, whereas they may set capital taxes sequentially in every stage game when a tax union comprises dissimilar countries. This finding is significantly different from Ogawa (2013), although we also assume that capital is owned by the country's residents, as in Ogawa's model. This is because a disadvantaged member country of the tax union would suffer from larger losses when a tax union comprising dissimilar countries, and thus the tax union will choose the strategy of moving Late for the sake of sustaining tax harmonization to avoid such losses.