Aesthetic Disagreement with Oneself as Another
Author:
Open Access
- 14 September 2023
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Helsinki University Press in Estetika: The European Journal of Aesthetics
- Vol. 60 (2) , 145-161
Abstract
Can disagreement with my past self about aesthetic matters give a reason to reconsider my present aesthetic verdict and if it does, under what conditions? In other words, can such a disagreement be a sign of my failing in my present aesthetic judgement? In this paper, I argue that revising one’s judgement in response to disagreeing with one’s former self is appropriate but only when the former and the present self share the same aesthetic personality. The possibility of failure in one’s aesthetic judgement is therefore bound up, among other things, with facts about one’s aesthetic identity over time. The resulting view has implications for our understanding of the scope of the autonomy in aesthetics and is consistent with empirical evidence regarding the way in which people evaluate aesthetic judgments.Keywords
Funding Information
- Estonian Research Council (MOBTP1004)
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