Uku Tooming
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Uku Tooming has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Kengo Miyazono
Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan
2 shared publications Kengo Miyazono
Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan
1 shared publication- Roomet Jakapi
Institute of Philosophy and Semiotics, University of Tartu, Jakobi 2, III Floor, 51005, Tartu, Tartu County, Estonia
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 20 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Neuropsychologia
- Vol. 227, 109465
Aphantasia as a challenge for Humean abstraction
- 20 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Neuropsychologia
- Vol. 227, 109465
Open AccessAphantasia as a challenge for Humean abstraction
- 18 July 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 85 (1) , 136-146
Sentimental perceptualism and affective imagination
According to sentimental perceptualism, affect grounds evaluative or normative knowledge in a similar way to the way perception grounds much of descriptive knowledge. In this paper, we present a novel challenge to sentimental perceptualism. At the centre of the challenge is the assumption that if affect is to ground knowledge in the same way as perception does, it should have a function to accurately represent evaluative properties, and if it has that function, it should also have it in its future-directed imaginative use. As the data on affective forecasting errors indicates, however, the affect system does not have that function. As a result, it is doubtful if affect can do the kind of knowledge-grounding work that sentimental perceptualism assumes it does.
- 18 July 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 85 (1) , 136-146
Sentimental perceptualism and affective imagination
According to sentimental perceptualism, affect grounds evaluative or normative knowledge in a similar way to the way perception grounds much of descriptive knowledge. In this paper, we present a novel challenge to sentimental perceptualism. At the centre of the challenge is the assumption that if affect is to ground knowledge in the same way as perception does, it should have a function to accurately represent evaluative properties, and if it has that function, it should also have it in its future-directed imaginative use. As the data on affective forecasting errors indicates, however, the affect system does not have that function. As a result, it is doubtful if affect can do the kind of knowledge-grounding work that sentimental perceptualism assumes it does.
- Open Access
- 13 May 2024
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in Philosophy and the Mind Sciences
- Vol. 5
Prospects for epistemic generationism about memory
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences (PhiMiSci) focuses on the interface between philosophy of mind, psychology, and cognitive neuroscience. PhiMiSci is a peer-reviewed, not-for-profit open-access journal that is free for authors and readers.
- 13 May 2024
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in Philosophy and the Mind Sciences
- Vol. 5
Open AccessProspects for epistemic generationism about memory
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences (PhiMiSci) focuses on the interface between philosophy of mind, psychology, and cognitive neuroscience. PhiMiSci is a peer-reviewed, not-for-profit open-access journal that is free for authors and readers.
- Open Access
- 14 September 2023
- Published by Helsinki University Press in Estetika: The European Journal of Aesthetics
- Vol. 60 (2) , 145-161
Aesthetic Disagreement with Oneself as Another
Can disagreement with my past self about aesthetic matters give a reason to reconsider my present aesthetic verdict and if it does, under what conditions? In other words, can such a disagreement be a sign of my failing in my present aesthetic judgement? In this paper, I argue that revising one’s judgement in response to disagreeing with one’s former self is appropriate but only when the former and the present self share the same aesthetic personality. The possibility of failure in one’s aesthetic judgement is therefore bound up, among other things, with facts about one’s aesthetic identity over time. The resulting view has implications for our understanding of the scope of the autonomy in aesthetics and is consistent with empirical evidence regarding the way in which people evaluate aesthetic judgments.
- 14 September 2023
- Published by Helsinki University Press in Estetika: The European Journal of Aesthetics
- Vol. 60 (2) , 145-161
Open AccessAesthetic Disagreement with Oneself as Another
Can disagreement with my past self about aesthetic matters give a reason to reconsider my present aesthetic verdict and if it does, under what conditions? In other words, can such a disagreement be a sign of my failing in my present aesthetic judgement? In this paper, I argue that revising one’s judgement in response to disagreeing with one’s former self is appropriate but only when the former and the present self share the same aesthetic personality. The possibility of failure in one’s aesthetic judgement is therefore bound up, among other things, with facts about one’s aesthetic identity over time. The resulting view has implications for our understanding of the scope of the autonomy in aesthetics and is consistent with empirical evidence regarding the way in which people evaluate aesthetic judgments.
- 25 May 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in British Journal of Aesthetics
- Vol. 64 (2) , 258-260
Taste: A Philosophy of Food
- 25 May 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in British Journal of Aesthetics
- Vol. 64 (2) , 258-260
Taste: A Philosophy of Food
- 2 January 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Aesthetics and Phenomenology
- Vol. 10 (1) , 89-93
Philosophy and the Art of WritingReview of Richard Shusterman’s Philosophy and the Art of Writing , Routledge, 2022, 142 pages. ISBN 9780367354909
- 2 January 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Aesthetics and Phenomenology
- Vol. 10 (1) , 89-93
Philosophy and the Art of WritingReview of Richard Shusterman’s Philosophy and the Art of Writing , Routledge, 2022, 142 pages. ISBN 9780367354909
- Open Access
- 21 December 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
- Vol. 24 (2) , 437-453
What does pleasure want?
Some philosophers and psychologists share an assumption that pleasure is by nature such that when an experience is pleasurable, an agent is motivated to continue having that experience. In this paper, I dispute this assumption. First, I point out how it does not make sense of the wanting-liking distinction in motivational neuroscience. Second, I present as a counterexample what I call’dynamic pleasure’ which does not motivate retaining one’s focus on the object of original experience but motivates an exploration of other options instead. Third, as another counterexample, I bring out pleasures of relief which are bound to pass when one’s discomfort is removed and in which case it is reasonable to assume that there is no motivation to maintain them. Fourth, I appeal to phenomenology of pleasure and argue that many experiences have a temporal shape which is in conflict with the self-maintenance assumption. As an example, I use the pleasure in listening to a song. The conclusion of the paper is that we should reject the self-maintenance assumption and consider seriously pluralism about the motivational structure of pleasure.
- 21 December 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
- Vol. 24 (2) , 437-453
Open AccessWhat does pleasure want?
Some philosophers and psychologists share an assumption that pleasure is by nature such that when an experience is pleasurable, an agent is motivated to continue having that experience. In this paper, I dispute this assumption. First, I point out how it does not make sense of the wanting-liking distinction in motivational neuroscience. Second, I present as a counterexample what I call’dynamic pleasure’ which does not motivate retaining one’s focus on the object of original experience but motivates an exploration of other options instead. Third, as another counterexample, I bring out pleasures of relief which are bound to pass when one’s discomfort is removed and in which case it is reasonable to assume that there is no motivation to maintain them. Fourth, I appeal to phenomenology of pleasure and argue that many experiences have a temporal shape which is in conflict with the self-maintenance assumption. As an example, I use the pleasure in listening to a song. The conclusion of the paper is that we should reject the self-maintenance assumption and consider seriously pluralism about the motivational structure of pleasure.
- Open Access
- 26 October 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 127-145
On the Putative Epistemic Generativity of Memory and Imagination
This chapter discusses how memory and imagination justify beliefs. There are at least two ways in which a source of justification justifies beliefs: (1) by generating new justification and (2) by preserving pre-existing justification that has been generated by some other sources. Does memory justify beliefs in the former way (generativism about memory) or in the latter way (preservationism about memory)? Does imagination justify beliefs (if it does at all) in the former way (generativism about imagination) or in the latter way (preservationism about imagination)? This chapter critically examines an argument, which we call the “argument from psychological generativity”, to the conclusion that both memory and imagination justify by generating new justification. According to the argument from psychological generativity, first, both memory and imagination are psychologically generative (i.e., generating new representations) and, second, psychological generativity implies epistemic generativity (i.e., generating new justification). The argument from psychological generativity fails, and we explain why and how it fails. We will not dispute the premise that both memory and imagination are psychologically generative, but we reject the other premise that psychological generativity implies epistemic generativity. In other words, even if it is true that both imagination and memory generate new representations rather than preserving prior representations, this does not mean that they generate new justification rather than preserving prior justification.
- 26 October 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 127-145
Open AccessOn the Putative Epistemic Generativity of Memory and Imagination
This chapter discusses how memory and imagination justify beliefs. There are at least two ways in which a source of justification justifies beliefs: (1) by generating new justification and (2) by preserving pre-existing justification that has been generated by some other sources. Does memory justify beliefs in the former way (generativism about memory) or in the latter way (preservationism about memory)? Does imagination justify beliefs (if it does at all) in the former way (generativism about imagination) or in the latter way (preservationism about imagination)? This chapter critically examines an argument, which we call the “argument from psychological generativity”, to the conclusion that both memory and imagination justify by generating new justification. According to the argument from psychological generativity, first, both memory and imagination are psychologically generative (i.e., generating new representations) and, second, psychological generativity implies epistemic generativity (i.e., generating new justification). The argument from psychological generativity fails, and we explain why and how it fails. We will not dispute the premise that both memory and imagination are psychologically generative, but we reject the other premise that psychological generativity implies epistemic generativity. In other words, even if it is true that both imagination and memory generate new representations rather than preserving prior representations, this does not mean that they generate new justification rather than preserving prior justification.
- 8 August 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 30 (4) , 381-398
Self-Knowledge of Desire: When Inference Is Not Enough
According to inferentialism about self-knowledge of desire, the basic way in which we come to know what we want is through inference. In this paper, I argue that in a wide range of cases of knowing one’s desire, inference is insufficient. In particular, I look at two inferentialist models, one proposed by Krista Lawlor and the other by Alex Byrne and look at the challenges that they face in securing safe self-ascriptions. In response to these difficulties, I argue that we can explain how inferentially based self-ascriptions can be safe when we consider the agent’s role in sustaining their desires through attending and elaborating on the content of desire through imagination.
- 8 August 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 30 (4) , 381-398
Self-Knowledge of Desire: When Inference Is Not Enough
According to inferentialism about self-knowledge of desire, the basic way in which we come to know what we want is through inference. In this paper, I argue that in a wide range of cases of knowing one’s desire, inference is insufficient. In particular, I look at two inferentialist models, one proposed by Krista Lawlor and the other by Alex Byrne and look at the challenges that they face in securing safe self-ascriptions. In response to these difficulties, I argue that we can explain how inferentially based self-ascriptions can be safe when we consider the agent’s role in sustaining their desires through attending and elaborating on the content of desire through imagination.
- 24 January 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of the American Philosophical Association
- Vol. 8 (2) , 259-277
Desire's Own Reasons
In this essay I ask if there are reasons that count in favor of having a desire in virtue of its attitudinal nature. I call those considerations desire's own reasons. I argue that desire's own reasons are considerations that explain why a desire meets its constitutive standard of correctness and that it meets this standard when its satisfaction would also be satisfactory to the subject who has it. Reasons that bear on subjective satisfaction are fit to regulate desires through experience and imagination because desires are naturally sensitive to them. I also analyze the limits of application that such reasons have and how desire's own reasons relate to other kinds of reasons.
- 24 January 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of the American Philosophical Association
- Vol. 8 (2) , 259-277
Desire's Own Reasons
In this essay I ask if there are reasons that count in favor of having a desire in virtue of its attitudinal nature. I call those considerations desire's own reasons. I argue that desire's own reasons are considerations that explain why a desire meets its constitutive standard of correctness and that it meets this standard when its satisfaction would also be satisfactory to the subject who has it. Reasons that bear on subjective satisfaction are fit to regulate desires through experience and imagination because desires are naturally sensitive to them. I also analyze the limits of application that such reasons have and how desire's own reasons relate to other kinds of reasons.