The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games
Open Access
- 12 July 2023
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Communications
- Vol. 14 (1) , 1-11
Abstract
Many human interactions feature the characteristics of social dilemmas where individual actions have consequences for the group and the environment. The feedback between behavior and environment can be studied with the framework of stochastic games. In stochastic games, the state of the environment can change, depending on the choices made by group members. Past work suggests that such feedback can reinforce cooperative behaviors. In particular, cooperation can evolve in stochastic games even if it is infeasible in each separate repeated game. In stochastic games, participants have an interest in conditioning their strategies on the state of the environment. Yet in many applications, precise information about the state could be scarce. Here, we study how the availability of information (or lack thereof) shapes evolution of cooperation. Already for simple examples of two state games we find surprising effects. In some cases, cooperation is only possible if there is precise information about the state of the environment. In other cases, cooperation is most abundant when there is no information about the state of the environment. We systematically analyze all stochastic games of a given complexity class, to determine when receiving information about the environment is better, neutral, or worse for evolution of cooperation.Keywords
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Funding Information
- EC | Horizon 2020 Framework Programme (754411)
- Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR-17-EURE-0010)
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