MKMaria Kleshnina

Maria Kleshnina

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Maria Kleshnina has a total of 54 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Network reciprocity reshaped by environmental knowledge and feedback

    by Amit Basak, Maria Kleshnina, Supratim Sengupta

    Cooperative interactions often unfold in environments that are shaped by collective behavior, yet how knowledge about such changing environments feeds back into evolutionary dynamics remains poorly understood. While network reciprocity explains how spatial structure enables clusters of cooperators to emerge and grow under certain conditions, it typically ignores how individuals respond to environmental change. Here, we integrate stochastic environmental feedback with network reciprocity to examine how knowledge about environmental state shapes the evolution of cooperation in structured populations. We compare regimes in which individuals either condition their behavior on the current state or remain unaware of it. Under weak selection, we derive a simple condition showing that cooperation is favored when the benefit-to-cost ratio exceeds a modified classic reciprocity threshold accounting for the effect of environmental transitions and state knowledge. Environmental shifts can either promote or hinder cooperation depending on accessibility and fidelity of state knowledge. Counterintuitively, greater knowledge does not universally enhance cooperation: for certain transition rules, state awareness raises the critical threshold for cooperation, a phenomenon we term a "knowledge curse". Our results reveal that, in an ever-changing environment, cooperation in structured populations emerges from a subtle interplay between environmental feedback and information availability.

  • Open Access

    When Policy Shapes Selection: Anticipating Evolutionary Feedbacks in Conservation

    by Kailas Honasoge, Luca Lubrano Lavadera, Matthew P Adams, Joel S Brown, KateřIna Staňková, Maria Kleshnina

    Applied ecology and conservation increasingly operate in systems where ecological and evolutionary processes are tightly coupled and can unfold on management-relevant timescales, yet most policy still treats populations as evolutionarily static. As a result, interventions often generate unintended outcomes, from resistance evolution and harvest-induced trait shifts to hidden losses of adaptive capacity under apparently stable management. We argue that conservation should be reframed as an evolutionary decision problem and propose Stackelberg evolutionary games (SEGs) as a framework for doing so. In SEGs, managers act as leaders who shape selective environments through policy, while populations and stakeholders respond as adaptive followers through ecological, behavioral, and evolutionary change. This framing makes explicit that conservation is not simply ecological control, but a strategic interaction with evolving systems. Through simple examples, we demonstrate how evolutionary rescue, evolutionary suicide, or hidden eco-evolutionary tipping points may arise depending on how interventions reshape fitness landscapes and how conservation objectives are formulated. Policies that stabilize population size in the short term may erode evolutionary stability and adaptability, whereas objectives that explicitly account for traits and their diversity can steer systems toward more robust long-term outcomes. SEGs provide a tractable framework for anticipating evolutionary feedbacks and designing conservation policy that works with, rather than against, evolution.

  • Open Access

    Time-Dependent Strategies in Repeated Asymmetric Public Goods Games

    by Valentin Hübner, Christian Hilbe, Manuel Staab, Maria Kleshnina, Krishnendu Chatterjee

    The public goods game is among the most studied metaphors of cooperation in groups. In this game, individuals can use their endowments to make contributions towards a good that benefits everyone. Each individual, however, is tempted to free-ride on the contributions of others. Herein, we study repeated public goods games among asymmetric players. Previous work has explored to which extent asymmetry allows for full cooperation, such that players contribute their full endowment each round. However, by design that work focusses on equilibria where individuals make the same contribution each round. Instead, here we consider players whose contributions along the equilibrium path can change from one round to the next. We do so for three different models – one without any budget constraints, one with endowment constraints, and one in which individuals can save their current endowment to be used in subsequent rounds. In each case, we explore two key quantities: the welfare and the resource efficiency that can be achieved in equilibrium. Welfare corresponds to the sum of all players’ payoffs. Resource efficiency relates this welfare to the total contributions made by the players. Compared to constant contribution sequences, we find that time-dependent contributions can improve resource efficiency across all three models. Moreover, they can improve the players’ welfare in the model with savings.


  • Open Access

    Efficiency and resilience of cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas

    by Valentin Hübner, Manuel Staab, Christian Hilbe, Krishnendu Chatterjee, Maria Kleshnina

    Direct reciprocity is a powerful mechanism for cooperation in social dilemmas. The very logic of reciprocity, however, seems to require that individuals are symmetric, and that everyone has the same means to influence each others’ payoffs. Yet in many applications, individuals are asymmetric. Herein, we study the effect of asymmetry in linear public good games. Individuals may differ in their endowments (their ability to contribute to a public good) and in their productivities (how effective their contributions are). Given the individuals’ productivities, we ask which allocation of endowments is optimal for cooperation. To this end, we consider two notions of optimality. The first notion focuses on the resilience of cooperation. The respective endowment distribution ensures that full cooperation is feasible even under the most adverse conditions. The second notion focuses on efficiency. The corresponding endowment distribution maximizes group welfare. Using analytical methods, we fully characterize these two endowment distributions. This analysis reveals that both optimality notions favor some endowment inequality: More productive players ought to get higher endowments. Yet the two notions disagree on how unequal endowments are supposed to be. A focus on resilience results in less inequality. With additional simulations, we show that the optimal endowment allocation needs to account for both the resilience and the efficiency of cooperation.


  • Open Access

    Evolutionary Games and Applications: Fifty Years of ‘The Logic of Animal Conflict’

    by Christian Hilbe, Maria Kleshnina, Kateřina Staňková


  • Open Access

    The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games

    by Maria Kleshnina, Christian Hilbe, Štěpán Šimsa, Krishnendu Chatterjee, Martin A. Nowak

    Many human interactions feature the characteristics of social dilemmas where individual actions have consequences for the group and the environment. The feedback between behavior and environment can be studied with the framework of stochastic games. In stochastic games, the state of the environment can change, depending on the choices made by group members. Past work suggests that such feedback can reinforce cooperative behaviors. In particular, cooperation can evolve in stochastic games even if it is infeasible in each separate repeated game. In stochastic games, participants have an interest in conditioning their strategies on the state of the environment. Yet in many applications, precise information about the state could be scarce. Here, we study how the availability of information (or lack thereof) shapes evolution of cooperation. Already for simple examples of two state games we find surprising effects. In some cases, cooperation is only possible if there is precise information about the state of the environment. In other cases, cooperation is most abundant when there is no information about the state of the environment. We systematically analyze all stochastic games of a given complexity class, to determine when receiving information about the environment is better, neutral, or worse for evolution of cooperation.


  • Open Access

    Empirical parameterisation and dynamical analysis of the allometric Rosenzweig-MacArthur equations

    by Jody C McKerral, Maria Kleshnina, Vladimir Ejov, Louise Bartle, James G Mitchell, Jerzy A Filar

    Allometric settings of population dynamics models are appealing due to their parsimonious nature and broad utility when studying system level effects. Here, we parameterise the size-scaled Rosenzweig-MacArthur differential equations to eliminate prey-mass dependency, facilitating an in depth analytic study of the equations which incorporates scaling parameters’ contributions to coexistence. We define the functional response term to match empirical findings, and examine situations where metabolic theory derivations and observation diverge. The dynamical properties of the Rosenzweig-MacArthur system, encompassing the distribution of size-abundance equilibria, the scaling of period and amplitude of population cycling, and relationships between predator and prey abundances, are consistent with empirical observation. Our parameterisation is an accurate minimal model across 15+ orders of mass magnitude.


  • Open Access

    Shifts in evolutionary balance of phenotypes under environmental changes

    by Maria Kleshnina, Jody C. McKerral, Cecilia González-Tokman, Jerzy A. Filar, James G. Mitchell

    Environments shape communities by driving individual interactions and the evolutionary outcome of competition. In static, homogeneous environments a robust, evolutionary stable, outcome is sometimes reachable. However, inherently stochastic, this evolutionary process need not stabilize, resulting in a dynamic ecological state, often observed in microbial communities. We use evolutionary games to study the evolution of phenotypic competition in dynamic environments. Under the assumption that phenotypic expression depends on the environmental shifts, existing periodic relationships may break or result in formation of new periodicity in phenotypic interactions. The exact outcome depends on the environmental shift itself, indicating the importance of understanding how environments influence affected systems. Under periodic environmental fluctuations, a stable state preserving dominant phenotypes may exist. However, rapid environmental shifts can lead to critical shifts in the phenotypic evolutionary balance. This might lead to environmentally favoured phenotypes dominating making the system vulnerable. We suggest that understanding of the robustness of the system’s current state is necessary to anticipate when it will shift to a new equilibrium via understanding what level of perturbations the system can take before its equilibrium changes. Our results provide insights in how microbial communities can be steered to states where they are dominated by desired phenotypes.


  • Open Access

    The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games

    by Maria Kleshnina, Christian Hilbe, Štěpán Šimsa, Krishnendu Chatterjee, Martin A. Nowak

    Many human interactions feature the characteristics of social dilemmas where individual actions can have consequences for the group and the environment. The feedback between behavior and environment can be studied with the framework of stochastic games. In stochastic games, the state of the environment can change, depending on the choices made by group members. Past work suggests that such feedback can reinforce cooperative behaviors. In particular, cooperation can evolve in stochastic games even if it is infeasible in each separate repeated game. In stochastic games, participants have an interest in conditioning their strategies on the state of the environment. Yet in many applications, precise information about the state could be scarce. Here, we study how the availability of information (or lack thereof) shapes evolution of cooperation. Already for simple examples of two state games we find surprising effects. In some cases, cooperation is only possible if there is precise information about the state of the environment. In other cases, cooperation is only possible if there is no information about the state of the environment. We systematically analyze all stochastic games of a given complexity class, to determine when receiving information about the environment is better, neutral, or worse for evolution of cooperation.