A theory of measuring, electing, and ranking
- 22 May 2007
- journal article
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 104 (21) , 8720-8725
Abstract
The impossibility theorems that abound in the theory of social choice show that there can be no satisfactory method for electing and ranking in the context of the traditional, 700-year-old model. A more realistic model, whose antecedents may be traced to Laplace and Galton, leads to a new theory that avoids all impossibilities with a simple and eminently practical method, “the majority judgement.” It has already been tested.Keywords
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