Michel Balinski
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Michel Balinski has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Rida Laraki
Moroccan Center for Game Theory, University Mohammed VI Polytechnic (UM6P), Rabat 43150, Morocco
3 shared publications Andrew Jennings
1 shared publication- Mourad Baïou
Laboratoire LIMOS, Université Clermont II, Campus des Cézeax, B.P. 125-63173 Aubière Cedex, France
1 shared publication Sylvan Sorin
École Polytechnique, 1 rue Descartes, 75005 Paris, France
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 November 2009
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 105 (2) , 145-147
Monotonic incompatibility between electing and ranking
- 1 November 2009
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 105 (2) , 145-147
Monotonic incompatibility between electing and ranking
- 1 July 2009
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 66 (2) , 594-597
David Gale in Paris
- 1 July 2009
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 66 (2) , 594-597
David Gale in Paris
- 22 May 2007
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 104 (21) , 8720-8725
A theory of measuring, electing, and ranking
The impossibility theorems that abound in the theory of social choice show that there can be no satisfactory method for electing and ranking in the context of the traditional, 700-year-old model. A more realistic model, whose antecedents may be traced to Laplace and Galton, leads to a new theory that avoids all impossibilities with a simple and eminently practical method, “the majority judgement.” It has already been tested.
- 22 May 2007
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 104 (21) , 8720-8725
A theory of measuring, electing, and ranking
The impossibility theorems that abound in the theory of social choice show that there can be no satisfactory method for electing and ranking in the context of the traditional, 700-year-old model. A more realistic model, whose antecedents may be traced to Laplace and Galton, leads to a new theory that avoids all impossibilities with a simple and eminently practical method, “the majority judgement.” It has already been tested.
- 17 August 2006
- Published by Elsevier in Operations Research Letters
- Vol. 35 (3) , 392-402
Characterizations of the optimal stable allocation mechanism
- 17 August 2006
- Published by Elsevier in Operations Research Letters
- Vol. 35 (3) , 392-402
Characterizations of the optimal stable allocation mechanism