A Note of Caution on Using Hotelling Models in Platform Markets
Preprint
- 10 April 2018
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
We study a Hotelling framework in which customers first pay a monopoly platform to enter the market before deciding between two competing services on opposite ends of a Hotelling line. This setup is common when modeling competition in Internet content provision. We find that standard taken-for-granted solution methods under full market coverage break down, and that in the unique full-coverage equilibrium, the competing service providers set substantially lower prices. Standard methods and prices are restored by giving service providers the first move.Keywords
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