Thomas D. Jeitschko
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Thomas D. Jeitschko has a total of 56 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Leonard J. Mirman
Department of Economics, University of Virginia, 114 Rouss Hall, Charlottesville, VA 22903, USA US
9 shared publications- Elmar G. Wolfstetter
School of Business and Economics, Humboldt-University at Berlin, Berlin, Germany
6 shared publications Rowena Pecchenino
NUI Maynooth - Department of Economics
5 shared publications- Dakshina G. De Silva
Lancaster University - Department of Economics
4 shared publications Neelam Jain
Rice University
4 shared publicationsAnthony Creane
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 5 February 2022
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 81
Welfare effects of product certification under latent adverse selection
- 5 February 2022
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 81
Welfare effects of product certification under latent adverse selection
- 25 December 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 170, 157-173
Naive and sophisticated mixing: Experimental evidence
- 25 December 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 170, 157-173
Naive and sophisticated mixing: Experimental evidence
- Open Access
- 1 January 2019
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Survey of Graduate Program Directors in Economics
In the summer of 2018 we surveyed Graduate Program Directors of Masters and PhD programs in Economics concerning their program characteristics and admissions practices, as well as their perceived attitudes concerning the training of women and under-represented minorities in the Economics Profession. Here we detail the survey, the process and the responses.
- 1 January 2019
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessSurvey of Graduate Program Directors in Economics
In the summer of 2018 we surveyed Graduate Program Directors of Masters and PhD programs in Economics concerning their program characteristics and admissions practices, as well as their perceived attitudes concerning the training of women and under-represented minorities in the Economics Profession. Here we detail the survey, the process and the responses.
- 1 November 2018
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 61, 155-191
Information Acquisition, signaling and learning in duopoly
- 1 November 2018
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 61, 155-191
Information Acquisition, signaling and learning in duopoly
- Open Access
- 10 April 2018
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
A Note of Caution on Using Hotelling Models in Platform Markets
We study a Hotelling framework in which customers first pay a monopoly platform to enter the market before deciding between two competing services on opposite ends of a Hotelling line. This setup is common when modeling competition in Internet content provision. We find that standard taken-for-granted solution methods under full market coverage break down, and that in the unique full-coverage equilibrium, the competing service providers set substantially lower prices. Standard methods and prices are restored by giving service providers the first move.
- 10 April 2018
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessA Note of Caution on Using Hotelling Models in Platform Markets
We study a Hotelling framework in which customers first pay a monopoly platform to enter the market before deciding between two competing services on opposite ends of a Hotelling line. This setup is common when modeling competition in Internet content provision. We find that standard taken-for-granted solution methods under full market coverage break down, and that in the unique full-coverage equilibrium, the competing service providers set substantially lower prices. Standard methods and prices are restored by giving service providers the first move.
- 7 March 2017
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 26 (3) , 571-589
Bundling and joint marketing by rival firms
We study joint marketing by firms who price discriminate between consumers who patronize only one firm (single purchasers) and those who purchase from both (bundle purchasers). Firms either set the price of the bundle and then compete along side the bundle; or they determine a rebate that is applied to joint purchasers and then set prices. Even though the pricing structure in the joint marketing scheme is determined noncooperatively, the commitment to the joint marketing agreement allows firms to leverage their stand‐alone prices—leading to higher profits and lower consumer surplus in either case, compared to both uniform pricing and independent price discrimination without a joint marketing agreement. Nevertheless the two schemes differ dramatically, in that rebates increase joint purchasing, whereas bundle pricing diminishes bundle purchases.
- 7 March 2017
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 26 (3) , 571-589
Bundling and joint marketing by rival firms
We study joint marketing by firms who price discriminate between consumers who patronize only one firm (single purchasers) and those who purchase from both (bundle purchasers). Firms either set the price of the bundle and then compete along side the bundle; or they determine a rebate that is applied to joint purchasers and then set prices. Even though the pricing structure in the joint marketing scheme is determined noncooperatively, the commitment to the joint marketing agreement allows firms to leverage their stand‐alone prices—leading to higher profits and lower consumer surplus in either case, compared to both uniform pricing and independent price discrimination without a joint marketing agreement. Nevertheless the two schemes differ dramatically, in that rebates increase joint purchasing, whereas bundle pricing diminishes bundle purchases.
- 22 September 2016
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 64 (3) , 494-519
Endogenous Entry in Markets with Unobserved Quality
Markets for experience and credence goods can suffer from adverse selection. The negative implication for trading and welfare poses the question of how such markets originate. We consider entry in markets in which each seller's quality becomes private information. Entry lowers prices, which can trigger adverse selection. The anticipated price collapse limits entry so that high prices are sustained, resulting in above normal profits. The analysis suggests that rather than observing the canonical market collapse, markets with asymmetric information about quality may have above normal profits and less entry than would be expected even when there is low concentration.
- 22 September 2016
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 64 (3) , 494-519
Endogenous Entry in Markets with Unobserved Quality
Markets for experience and credence goods can suffer from adverse selection. The negative implication for trading and welfare poses the question of how such markets originate. We consider entry in markets in which each seller's quality becomes private information. Entry lowers prices, which can trigger adverse selection. The anticipated price collapse limits entry so that high prices are sustained, resulting in above normal profits. The analysis suggests that rather than observing the canonical market collapse, markets with asymmetric information about quality may have above normal profits and less entry than would be expected even when there is low concentration.
- 15 September 2016
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- Vol. 7992, 1-9
Truthful Online Double Auctions with Real-Time Stochastic Arrival of Demand and Supply
Online spectrum auctions will play a pivotal role in restructuring the existing spectrum allocation system given growing spectrum demand from users with diverse requirements. The research in this field mainly concentrates on designing truthful mechanisms in a static or partially dynamic setting. This setting, however, does not capture the fact that spectrum becomes available according to primary users' activities, and the reserve price for this unused spectrum differs from one primary user to another. The number of secondary users with spectrum demand, their transmission deadlines, and their valuations for their transmissions also vary in time and space. Existing research cannot ensure truthful reporting of participants in presence of such diversity in demand and supply. In this work, we consider such a dynamic secondary market and present two spectrum allocation and pricing algorithms. The first algorithm requires distribution knowledge of bidders and sellers, and assesses the winning probability and payment amount of participants based on a priority function. The second algorithm determines the payment amount by exploring the interference relationships between bidders, their transmission deadlines and valuations without any distribution knowledge. We analytically prove that both these algorithms satisfy three desired auction properties - truthfulness, individual rationality, and budget balance. Finally, we present simulation results to analyze the performance of these two algorithms under different auction settings.
- 15 September 2016
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- Vol. 7992, 1-9
Truthful Online Double Auctions with Real-Time Stochastic Arrival of Demand and Supply
Online spectrum auctions will play a pivotal role in restructuring the existing spectrum allocation system given growing spectrum demand from users with diverse requirements. The research in this field mainly concentrates on designing truthful mechanisms in a static or partially dynamic setting. This setting, however, does not capture the fact that spectrum becomes available according to primary users' activities, and the reserve price for this unused spectrum differs from one primary user to another. The number of secondary users with spectrum demand, their transmission deadlines, and their valuations for their transmissions also vary in time and space. Existing research cannot ensure truthful reporting of participants in presence of such diversity in demand and supply. In this work, we consider such a dynamic secondary market and present two spectrum allocation and pricing algorithms. The first algorithm requires distribution knowledge of bidders and sellers, and assesses the winning probability and payment amount of participants based on a priority function. The second algorithm determines the payment amount by exploring the interference relationships between bidders, their transmission deadlines and valuations without any distribution knowledge. We analytically prove that both these algorithms satisfy three desired auction properties - truthfulness, individual rationality, and budget balance. Finally, we present simulation results to analyze the performance of these two algorithms under different auction settings.
- 15 September 2016
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 1-9
Bid and Time Strategyproof Online Spectrum Auctions with Dynamic User Arrival and Dynamic Spectrum Supply
The allocation of underutilized spectrum from primary users to secondary users in real time is likely the most promising avenue for advancing efficiency of spectrum use given the ever-increasing demand for transmission. Research in this area has focused on auctions to facilitate the distribution of spectrum, inducing truthful reporting by participants. However, most research has assumed a static or partially dynamic setting. These approaches are unable to capture that spectrum becomes available at random intervals as primary users' needs vary across time; and, similarly, secondary users' needs vary over time. Moreover, frequently there is flexibility regarding the time of transmission - with some transmissions being more urgent and time-sensitive than others. Therefore, existing research cannot be directly applied to such auction environments involving users with variable transmission deadlines, while preserving efficiency and truthfulness. In this work, we design SOADE, a strategyproof online auction mechanism in dynamic environments that considers dynamic arrival of bidders with varying transmission deadlines and dynamic availability of spectrum. SOADE builds on a priority function that determines the rank of a bidder of winning spectrum at an auction considering its valuation, deadline, and uncertainty associated with dynamic arrival of bidders and spectrum availability. We analytically prove that SOADE is truthful and ex ante and ex post individually rational. Finally, we perform numerical simulation to demonstrate the efficiency of SOADE and show that it improves auction revenue compared to prior work.
- 15 September 2016
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 1-9
Bid and Time Strategyproof Online Spectrum Auctions with Dynamic User Arrival and Dynamic Spectrum Supply
The allocation of underutilized spectrum from primary users to secondary users in real time is likely the most promising avenue for advancing efficiency of spectrum use given the ever-increasing demand for transmission. Research in this area has focused on auctions to facilitate the distribution of spectrum, inducing truthful reporting by participants. However, most research has assumed a static or partially dynamic setting. These approaches are unable to capture that spectrum becomes available at random intervals as primary users' needs vary across time; and, similarly, secondary users' needs vary over time. Moreover, frequently there is flexibility regarding the time of transmission - with some transmissions being more urgent and time-sensitive than others. Therefore, existing research cannot be directly applied to such auction environments involving users with variable transmission deadlines, while preserving efficiency and truthfulness. In this work, we design SOADE, a strategyproof online auction mechanism in dynamic environments that considers dynamic arrival of bidders with varying transmission deadlines and dynamic availability of spectrum. SOADE builds on a priority function that determines the rank of a bidder of winning spectrum at an auction considering its valuation, deadline, and uncertainty associated with dynamic arrival of bidders and spectrum availability. We analytically prove that SOADE is truthful and ex ante and ex post individually rational. Finally, we perform numerical simulation to demonstrate the efficiency of SOADE and show that it improves auction revenue compared to prior work.
- 1 April 2016
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 83, 185-197
Exporting to bypass weak institutions
- 1 April 2016
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 83, 185-197
Exporting to bypass weak institutions