H.L.A. Hart on Legal Moralism and Social Morality
Open Access
- 27 September 2024
- journal article
- Published by Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL in Roczniki Filozoficzne
- Vol. 72 (3) , 239-257
Abstract
After explaining legal moralism, this paper introduces the so-called “Hart-Devlin debate” on sexual morality in the philosophy of law. First, it reviews Hart’s revisions of Mill’s no-harm principle to cope with some counterexamples that favor the legal enforcement of morality even in the presence of consent or the absence of physical harm. Then, the paper examines the main arguments for both the disintegration and conservative theses of the legal moralists Devlin and Stephen, together with Hart’s replies to them. Furthermore, it relates the Hart-Devlin debate, reframed as a controversy between “thin” and “thick” legal moralists, to different conceptions of social morality Oxford philosophy of the 1950s and 1960s. Finally, the paper indicates why a qualified moral conservatism, also with regard to sexual morality, is warranted if the very notion of morality is given due consideration.Keywords
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