Stefaan E. Cuypers
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Stefaan E. Cuypers has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 27 September 2024
- Published by Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL in Roczniki Filozoficzne
- Vol. 72 (3) , 239-257
H.L.A. Hart on Legal Moralism and Social Morality
After explaining legal moralism, this paper introduces the so-called “Hart-Devlin debate” on sexual morality in the philosophy of law. First, it reviews Hart’s revisions of Mill’s no-harm principle to cope with some counterexamples that favor the legal enforcement of morality even in the presence of consent or the absence of physical harm. Then, the paper examines the main arguments for both the disintegration and conservative theses of the legal moralists Devlin and Stephen, together with Hart’s replies to them. Furthermore, it relates the Hart-Devlin debate, reframed as a controversy between “thin” and “thick” legal moralists, to different conceptions of social morality Oxford philosophy of the 1950s and 1960s. Finally, the paper indicates why a qualified moral conservatism, also with regard to sexual morality, is warranted if the very notion of morality is given due consideration.
- 27 September 2024
- Published by Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL in Roczniki Filozoficzne
- Vol. 72 (3) , 239-257
Open AccessH.L.A. Hart on Legal Moralism and Social Morality
After explaining legal moralism, this paper introduces the so-called “Hart-Devlin debate” on sexual morality in the philosophy of law. First, it reviews Hart’s revisions of Mill’s no-harm principle to cope with some counterexamples that favor the legal enforcement of morality even in the presence of consent or the absence of physical harm. Then, the paper examines the main arguments for both the disintegration and conservative theses of the legal moralists Devlin and Stephen, together with Hart’s replies to them. Furthermore, it relates the Hart-Devlin debate, reframed as a controversy between “thin” and “thick” legal moralists, to different conceptions of social morality Oxford philosophy of the 1950s and 1960s. Finally, the paper indicates why a qualified moral conservatism, also with regard to sexual morality, is warranted if the very notion of morality is given due consideration.
- 4 January 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy
- Vol. 99 (2) , 165-190
P.F. Strawson on Punishment and the Hypothesis of Symbolic Retribution
Strawson's view on punishment has been either neglected or recoiled from in contemporary scholarship on ‘Freedom and Resentment’ (FR). Strawson's alleged retributivism has made his view suspect and troublesome. In this article, we first argue, against the mainstream, that the punishment passage is an indispensable part of the main argument in FR (section 1) and elucidate in what sense Strawson can be called ‘a retributivist’ (section 2). We then elaborate our own hypothesis of symbolic retribution to explain the continuum between moral reactive attitudes and punishment that Strawson only adumbrates (section 3). After this justification of the punitive response to wrongdoing, we compare and contrast our specific kind of retributivist hypothesis with other positions in the so-called ‘new retributivism’ (section 4). Our hypothesis differs from other subvarieties of expressive retributivism in putting centre stage the idea of punishment as taking up a reverential stance towards the victim.
- 4 January 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy
- Vol. 99 (2) , 165-190
P.F. Strawson on Punishment and the Hypothesis of Symbolic Retribution
Strawson's view on punishment has been either neglected or recoiled from in contemporary scholarship on ‘Freedom and Resentment’ (FR). Strawson's alleged retributivism has made his view suspect and troublesome. In this article, we first argue, against the mainstream, that the punishment passage is an indispensable part of the main argument in FR (section 1) and elucidate in what sense Strawson can be called ‘a retributivist’ (section 2). We then elaborate our own hypothesis of symbolic retribution to explain the continuum between moral reactive attitudes and punishment that Strawson only adumbrates (section 3). After this justification of the punitive response to wrongdoing, we compare and contrast our specific kind of retributivist hypothesis with other positions in the so-called ‘new retributivism’ (section 4). Our hypothesis differs from other subvarieties of expressive retributivism in putting centre stage the idea of punishment as taking up a reverential stance towards the victim.
- 21 July 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Moral Education
- Vol. 50 (2) , 122-139
R. S. Peters’ philosophy of moral education in relation to his Freudian psychology
One of R. S. Peters’ interests was psychoanalysis. In this paper, I explore the relation between Peters’ philosophy of moral education and his Freudian psychology. In section 2 of the paper, I introduce Peters’ Freudian supplementation of the Piaget-Kohlberg model of moral development. To clarify the way in which Peters deals with two unresolved issues of this model, I examine, in section 3, his account of Freud’s conceptions of mental health and illness, character and the emotions. In section 4, I bring to light the continuity between Freudian psychology and Peters’ levels of life theory. In section 5, I employ this Freud-inspired anthropological theory to elucidate Peters’ comprehensive analysis of the concept of education.
- 21 July 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Moral Education
- Vol. 50 (2) , 122-139
R. S. Peters’ philosophy of moral education in relation to his Freudian psychology
One of R. S. Peters’ interests was psychoanalysis. In this paper, I explore the relation between Peters’ philosophy of moral education and his Freudian psychology. In section 2 of the paper, I introduce Peters’ Freudian supplementation of the Piaget-Kohlberg model of moral development. To clarify the way in which Peters deals with two unresolved issues of this model, I examine, in section 3, his account of Freud’s conceptions of mental health and illness, character and the emotions. In section 4, I bring to light the continuity between Freudian psychology and Peters’ levels of life theory. In section 5, I employ this Freud-inspired anthropological theory to elucidate Peters’ comprehensive analysis of the concept of education.
- Open Access
- 30 June 2020
- Published by Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL in Roczniki Filozoficzne
- Vol. 68 (2) , 139-154
The Curious Sensations of Pain, Hunger and Thirst. Reliabilism in the Second Part of Descartes’ Sixth Meditation
Osobliwość takich doznań, jak ból, głód i pragnienie. Reliabilizm w drugiej części szóstej Medytacji Kartezjusza Artykuł omawia epistemiczny status cielesnych doznań takich, jak ból, głód i pragnienia, o których mowa w drugiej części szóstej Medytacji Kartezjusza. Argumentuję, że ów fragment stanowi integralny komponent epistemologicznego programu, który można znaleźć w Medytacjach. Na ogół widzi się Kartezjusza jako zwolennika infallibilizmu, internalizmu oraz fundacjonalizmu. Tymczasem w odniesieniu do wiedzy i przekonań opartych na doznaniach cielesnych przyjmuje on fallibilizm, eksternalizm i reliabilizm. Na rzecz tego wniosku przemawia z jednej strony, analiza tego, czego naucza nas – według Kartezjusza – natura przez wrażenia bólu, głodu i pragnienia, z drugiej strony jego analiza błędów, którym podlega nasza natura, przeprowadzona przeze mnie z wykorzystaniem zaproponowanego przez Wilfrida Sellarsa podziału na logiczną przestrzeń rozumu oraz empiryczną przestrzeń przyczyn.
- 30 June 2020
- Published by Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL in Roczniki Filozoficzne
- Vol. 68 (2) , 139-154
Open AccessThe Curious Sensations of Pain, Hunger and Thirst. Reliabilism in the Second Part of Descartes’ Sixth Meditation
Osobliwość takich doznań, jak ból, głód i pragnienie. Reliabilizm w drugiej części szóstej Medytacji Kartezjusza Artykuł omawia epistemiczny status cielesnych doznań takich, jak ból, głód i pragnienia, o których mowa w drugiej części szóstej Medytacji Kartezjusza. Argumentuję, że ów fragment stanowi integralny komponent epistemologicznego programu, który można znaleźć w Medytacjach. Na ogół widzi się Kartezjusza jako zwolennika infallibilizmu, internalizmu oraz fundacjonalizmu. Tymczasem w odniesieniu do wiedzy i przekonań opartych na doznaniach cielesnych przyjmuje on fallibilizm, eksternalizm i reliabilizm. Na rzecz tego wniosku przemawia z jednej strony, analiza tego, czego naucza nas – według Kartezjusza – natura przez wrażenia bólu, głodu i pragnienia, z drugiej strony jego analiza błędów, którym podlega nasza natura, przeprowadzona przeze mnie z wykorzystaniem zaproponowanego przez Wilfrida Sellarsa podziału na logiczną przestrzeń rozumu oraz empiryczną przestrzeń przyczyn.
- Open Access
- 1 September 2019
- Published by Universidad Nacional de Colombia in Ideas y Valores
- Vol. 68 (171) , 231-249
The Strawsonian and Ledger Conception of Moral Responsibility
This paper returns to the very concept of moral responsibility. Its focus is not on the conditions but on the nature of moral responsibility. First, it introduces the Strawsonian and ledger conceptions of moral responsibility. Next, it contrasts and compares these conceptions. Finally, it evaluates both conceptions and asks which is the right one. Though this article works toward further clarifying the concept of moral responsibility, its conclusion is open-ended.
- 1 September 2019
- Published by Universidad Nacional de Colombia in Ideas y Valores
- Vol. 68 (171) , 231-249
Open AccessThe Strawsonian and Ledger Conception of Moral Responsibility
This paper returns to the very concept of moral responsibility. Its focus is not on the conditions but on the nature of moral responsibility. First, it introduces the Strawsonian and ledger conceptions of moral responsibility. Next, it contrasts and compares these conceptions. Finally, it evaluates both conceptions and asks which is the right one. Though this article works toward further clarifying the concept of moral responsibility, its conclusion is open-ended.
- 18 August 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 101-116
“Plowden” at 50—R.S. Peters’ Response to Educational Progressivism
- 18 August 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 101-116
“Plowden” at 50—R.S. Peters’ Response to Educational Progressivism
- 10 June 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 629-648
Analytic Philosophy of Education and the Concept of Liberal Education
- 10 June 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 629-648
Analytic Philosophy of Education and the Concept of Liberal Education
- 14 September 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Educational Philosophy and Theory
- Vol. 50 (6-7) , 702-711
The existential concern of the humanities R.S. Peters’ justification of liberal education
Richard Stanley Peters was one of the founding fathers of analytic philosophy of education in the twentieth century. After reviewing Peters’ disentanglement of the ambiguities of liberal education, I reconstruct his view on the status and the existential foundations of the humanities. What emerges from my reconstruction is an original justificatory argument for the value of liberal education as general education in the sense of initiation into the heritage of the humanities. To close, I evaluate the scope and power of this argument from the existential concern of the humanities.
- 14 September 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Educational Philosophy and Theory
- Vol. 50 (6-7) , 702-711
The existential concern of the humanities R.S. Peters’ justification of liberal education
Richard Stanley Peters was one of the founding fathers of analytic philosophy of education in the twentieth century. After reviewing Peters’ disentanglement of the ambiguities of liberal education, I reconstruct his view on the status and the existential foundations of the humanities. What emerges from my reconstruction is an original justificatory argument for the value of liberal education as general education in the sense of initiation into the heritage of the humanities. To close, I evaluate the scope and power of this argument from the existential concern of the humanities.
- Open Access
- 1 December 2010
- Published by University of Warsaw in Etyka
- Vol. 43, 92-110
Autonomia hierarchiczna, samoidentyfikacja i samoocena
W niniejszym artykule chcę się krytycznie ustosunkować do tzw. hierarchicznego modelu autonomii osoby ludzkiej, wprowadzając kilka poprawek do zasadniczych idei owego modelu: idei samoidentyfikacji osoby (self-identification) i jej samooceny (self-evaluation). Rezultatem moich zabiegów będzie zastąpienie koncepcji skrajnej autonomii osobowej przez ideę troski o samego siebie, mówiąc inaczej, zastąpienie wizji osoby skrajnie autonomicznej przez wizję umiarkowanie heteronomiczną.
- 1 December 2010
- Published by University of Warsaw in Etyka
- Vol. 43, 92-110
Open AccessAutonomia hierarchiczna, samoidentyfikacja i samoocena
W niniejszym artykule chcę się krytycznie ustosunkować do tzw. hierarchicznego modelu autonomii osoby ludzkiej, wprowadzając kilka poprawek do zasadniczych idei owego modelu: idei samoidentyfikacji osoby (self-identification) i jej samooceny (self-evaluation). Rezultatem moich zabiegów będzie zastąpienie koncepcji skrajnej autonomii osobowej przez ideę troski o samego siebie, mówiąc inaczej, zastąpienie wizji osoby skrajnie autonomicznej przez wizję umiarkowanie heteronomiczną.