Traffic Scheduling and Revenue Distribution Among Providers in the Internet: Tradeoffs and Impacts
Authors:
- 26 January 2017
- journal article
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
- Vol. 35 (2) , 421-431
Abstract
The Internet consists of economically selfish players in terms of access/transit connection and content distribution. Such selfish behaviors often lead to techno-economic inefficiencies, such as unstable peering and revenue imbalance. Recent research results suggest that cooperation-based fair revenue sharing, i.e., multi-level Internet service provider (ISP) settlements, can be a candidate solution to avoid unfair revenue share. However, it has been under-explored whether selfish ISPs actually cooperate or not (often referred to as the stability of coalition), because they may partially cooperate or even do not cooperate, depending on how much revenue is distributed to each individual ISP. In this paper, we study this stability of coalition in the Internet, where our aim is to investigate the conditions under which ISPs cooperate under different regimes on the traffic demand and network bandwidth. We first consider the under-demanded regime, i.e., network bandwidth exceeds traffic demand, where revenue sharing based on Shapley value leads ISPs to entirely cooperate, i.e., stability of the grand coalition. Next, we consider the over-demanded regime, i.e., traffic demand exceeds network bandwidth, where there may exist some ISPs who deviate from the grand coalition. In particular, this deviation depends on how users' traffic is handled inside the network, for which we consider three traffic scheduling policies having various degrees of content-value preference. We analytically compare those three scheduling policies in terms of network neutrality, and stability of cooperation that provides useful implications on when and how multi-level ISP settlements help and how the Internet should be operated for stable peering and revenue balance among ISPs.Keywords
Funding Information
- Institute for Information and Communications Technology Promotion (IITP) Grant
- Korea government (MSIP) (B0717-16-0034)
- Versatile Network System Architecture for Multi-Dimensional Diversity
- IITP Grant
- Korea government (MSIP) (B0126-16-1078)
- Creation of PEP based on automatic protocol behavior analysis and resource management for hyper connected for IoT Services
- Brain Korea 21 Program for Leading Universities and Students (BK21 PLUS)
This publication has 23 references indexed in Scilit:
- On the competition of CDN companies: Impact of new telco-CDNs' federation2016
- Generating innovative interconnection business models for the future internetinfo, 2013
- On the Payoff Mechanisms in Peer-Assisted Services With Multiple Content Providers: Rationality and FairnessIEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 2013
- Revenue sharing among ISPs in two-sided markets2011
- On the Quantification of Value Networks: A Dependency Model for Interconnection Scenarios2011
- On the interaction between ISP revenue sharing and network neutrality2010
- Pricing under Constraints in Access Networks: Revenue Maximization and Congestion Management2010
- Interactions, Competition and Innovation in a Service-Oriented Internet: An Economic Model2010
- Network Neutrality, Search Neutrality, and the Never-ending Conflict between Efficiency and Fairness in MarketsReview of Network Economics, 2009
- Net neutralityACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review, 2007