Advances in Reed-Solomon Code-Based Masking and Application to ML-KEM
Open Access
- 6 October 2025
- journal article
- Published by International Association for Cryptologic Research in IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Vol. 2 (3)
Abstract
Physical attacks such as Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) or Fault Injection Attacks (FIA) can recover sensitive data from cryptographic primitives otherwise thought theoretically secure. To counter such threats, generic countermeasures such as masking are studied. In this work, we provide some advances on one particular form of masking, Reed-Solomon Code-Based Masking (RS-CBM). Although its application to the AES primitive with Boolean logic has been investigated, we propose arithmetic gadgets and constrained conversions from arithmetic to boolean logic and back. We also investigate Cost-Amortisation (CA), a method to encode several sensitive data into one masked code word, and propose techniques to swap between an un-amortised masking and an amortised one. Security is experimentally verified by performing a Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA) on a SAM4S target thanks to a Chipwhisperer Husky. We also provide formal proofs of security in the SNI model. Finally, we apply our gadgets to a post-quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM), ML-KEM. Notably, we propose a full arithmetisation of the masked calculations of the message compression and of the ciphertext comparison of ML-KEM.Keywords
Funding Information
- Agence de l'innovation de Défense (2022156)
This publication has 37 references indexed in Scilit:
- A Side-Channel Attack on a Higher-Order Masked CRYSTALS-Kyber Implementation2024
- Combined Fault and Leakage Resilience: Composability, Constructions and Compiler2023
- How to Securely Compute with Noisy Leakage in Quasilinear Complexity2018
- Towards Sound and Optimal Leakage Detection Procedure2018
- Analysis and Improvement of the Generic Higher-Order Masking Scheme of FSE 20122013
- On Ideal Lattices and Learning with Errors over Rings2010
- Private Circuits: Securing Hardware against Probing Attacks2003
- Towards Sound Approaches to Counteract Power-Analysis Attacks1999
- Secure Integration of Asymmetric and Symmetric Encryption Schemes1999
- Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems1996