Cédric Tavernier
Research Subjects
Cédric Tavernier has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Pierre-Augustin Berthet
Hensoldt France SAS
2 shared publications - Abderrahman Daif
BULL-SAS, Les Clayes-sous-Bois, France
1 shared publication - Brice Colombier
Laboratoire Hubert Curien UMR 5516
1 shared publication - Claude Carlet
University of Paris 8 Saint-Denis France
1 shared publication - Justine Paillet
UNIVERSITÉ JEAN-MONNET SAINT-ETIENNE
1 shared publication - Laurent Sauvage
Institut Polytechnique de Paris
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 6 October 2025
- Published by International Association for Cryptologic Research in IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Vol. 2 (3)
Advances in Reed-Solomon Code-Based Masking and Application to ML-KEM
Physical attacks such as Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) or Fault Injection Attacks (FIA) can recover sensitive data from cryptographic primitives otherwise thought theoretically secure. To counter such threats, generic countermeasures such as masking are studied. In this work, we provide some advances on one particular form of masking, Reed-Solomon Code-Based Masking (RS-CBM). Although its application to the AES primitive with Boolean logic has been investigated, we propose arithmetic gadgets and constrained conversions from arithmetic to boolean logic and back. We also investigate Cost-Amortisation (CA), a method to encode several sensitive data into one masked code word, and propose techniques to swap between an un-amortised masking and an amortised one. Security is experimentally verified by performing a Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA) on a SAM4S target thanks to a Chipwhisperer Husky. We also provide formal proofs of security in the SNI model. Finally, we apply our gadgets to a post-quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM), ML-KEM. Notably, we propose a full arithmetisation of the masked calculations of the message compression and of the ciphertext comparison of ML-KEM.
- 6 October 2025
- Published by International Association for Cryptologic Research in IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Vol. 2 (3)
Open AccessAdvances in Reed-Solomon Code-Based Masking and Application to ML-KEM
Physical attacks such as Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) or Fault Injection Attacks (FIA) can recover sensitive data from cryptographic primitives otherwise thought theoretically secure. To counter such threats, generic countermeasures such as masking are studied. In this work, we provide some advances on one particular form of masking, Reed-Solomon Code-Based Masking (RS-CBM). Although its application to the AES primitive with Boolean logic has been investigated, we propose arithmetic gadgets and constrained conversions from arithmetic to boolean logic and back. We also investigate Cost-Amortisation (CA), a method to encode several sensitive data into one masked code word, and propose techniques to swap between an un-amortised masking and an amortised one. Security is experimentally verified by performing a Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA) on a SAM4S target thanks to a Chipwhisperer Husky. We also provide formal proofs of security in the SNI model. Finally, we apply our gadgets to a post-quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM), ML-KEM. Notably, we propose a full arithmetisation of the masked calculations of the message compression and of the ciphertext comparison of ML-KEM.
- Open Access
Arithmetisation of the Floor Function and Its Applications to Homomorphic Cryptography
Cryptography has historically been based on integer arithmetic. Thus, there was no need to investigate functions related to real numbers or analysis, such as the fractional part or the floor function. The floor function has several applications in modern cryptography. Its arithmetisation can allow for the application of generic side-channel countermeasures, like masking, without being limited by the chosen representation of rationnal or real numbers. It has also some applications in Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE), either directly in CKKS, or indirectly, as an arithmetised floor function can be computed with FHE. A consequence is the possibility of protecting normalisation or discretisation operations in Machine Learning or Deep Learning. In this work, we perform the arithmetisation by adapting a Fourier series and speeding up its convergence by composing partial series with themselves.
Open AccessArithmetisation of the Floor Function and Its Applications to Homomorphic Cryptography
Cryptography has historically been based on integer arithmetic. Thus, there was no need to investigate functions related to real numbers or analysis, such as the fractional part or the floor function. The floor function has several applications in modern cryptography. Its arithmetisation can allow for the application of generic side-channel countermeasures, like masking, without being limited by the chosen representation of rationnal or real numbers. It has also some applications in Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE), either directly in CKKS, or indirectly, as an arithmetised floor function can be computed with FHE. A consequence is the possibility of protecting normalisation or discretisation operations in Machine Learning or Deep Learning. In this work, we perform the arithmetisation by adapting a Fourier series and speeding up its convergence by composing partial series with themselves.
- Open Access
- 13 January 2025
- Published by International Association for Cryptologic Research in IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Vol. 1 (4)
Masked Computation of the Floor Function and Its Application to the FALCON Signature
FALCON is a signature selected for standardisation of the new Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) primitives by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). However, it remains a challenge to define efficient countermeasures against side-channel attacks (SCA) for this algorithm. FALCON is a lattice-based signature that relies on rational numbers, which is unusual in the cryptography field. Although recent work proposed a solution to mask the addition and the multiplication, some roadblocks remain, most noticeably, how to protect the floor function. In this work, we propose to complete the first existing tests of hardening FALCON against SCA. We perform the mathematical proofs of our methods as well as formal security proofs in the probing model by ensuring Multiple Input Multiple Output Strong Non-Interference (MIMO-SNI) security. We provide performances on a laptop computer of our gadgets as well as of a complete masked FALCON. We notice significant overhead in doing so and discuss the deployability of our method in a real-world context.
- 13 January 2025
- Published by International Association for Cryptologic Research in IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Vol. 1 (4)
Open AccessMasked Computation of the Floor Function and Its Application to the FALCON Signature
FALCON is a signature selected for standardisation of the new Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) primitives by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). However, it remains a challenge to define efficient countermeasures against side-channel attacks (SCA) for this algorithm. FALCON is a lattice-based signature that relies on rational numbers, which is unusual in the cryptography field. Although recent work proposed a solution to mask the addition and the multiplication, some roadblocks remain, most noticeably, how to protect the floor function. In this work, we propose to complete the first existing tests of hardening FALCON against SCA. We perform the mathematical proofs of our methods as well as formal security proofs in the probing model by ensuring Multiple Input Multiple Output Strong Non-Interference (MIMO-SNI) security. We provide performances on a laptop computer of our gadgets as well as of a complete masked FALCON. We notice significant overhead in doing so and discuss the deployability of our method in a real-world context.
- 4 November 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
- Vol. 14 (2) , 223-240
A masking method based on orthonormal spaces, protecting several bytes against both SCA and FIA with a reduced cost
- 4 November 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
- Vol. 14 (2) , 223-240
A masking method based on orthonormal spaces, protecting several bytes against both SCA and FIA with a reduced cost