Complementarities among authority, accountability, and monitoring: Evidence from Japanese business groups
Authors:
- Hideshi ItohHIHideshi Itoh
- Tatsuya KikutaniTKTatsuya Kikutani
- Osamu HayashidaOHOsamu Hayashida
Open Access
- 30 June 2008
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of the Japanese and International Economies
- Vol. 22 (2) , 207-228
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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