Hideshi Itoh
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Hideshi Itoh has a total of 33 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Shingo Ishiguro
2 shared publicationsZenichi Shishido
2 shared publications- Akio Hoshi
Gakushuin University
1 shared publication Akira Tokutsu
1 shared publication- Curtis J. Milhaupt
Columbia Law School
1 shared publication - Daiji Kawaguchi
The University of Tokyo
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Image Concerns in Organizations
This paper provides a formal analysis of social image concerns and their motivational effects within teams and organizations. Agents are characterized by private attributes capturing individual self-interest, prosocial concern for the organization, and social image concerns. Assuming that agents value being perceived as organizationally concerned, we derive the principal's optimal incentive contract and characterize the resulting effort levels under various conditions. Image concerns give rise to reputational incentives; however, these are attenuated by monetary incentives, leading to lower-powered optimal contracts. Nevertheless, image concerns give rise to positive peer effects in the workplace and thereby benefit organizations by alleviating the free-rider problem. Our framework offers a resolution to the team-size puzzle by providing a novel microfoundation for positive team effects based on reputational incentives within the organization. We apply the model to important organizational issues and illustrate how team size, team diversity, and the integration of outsiders enhances work incentives and overall firm performance via the channel of image concerns. We discuss implications for teams, organizations, and corporate culture. Finally, we extend the model to negative as well as hierarchical image concerns. Our findings emphasize that image concerns are a genuine organizational incentive instrument interacting closely with explicit contracts. Altogether, optimal organizational design balances monetary incentives, organizational identity, and reputational image concerns.
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessImage Concerns in Organizations
This paper provides a formal analysis of social image concerns and their motivational effects within teams and organizations. Agents are characterized by private attributes capturing individual self-interest, prosocial concern for the organization, and social image concerns. Assuming that agents value being perceived as organizationally concerned, we derive the principal's optimal incentive contract and characterize the resulting effort levels under various conditions. Image concerns give rise to reputational incentives; however, these are attenuated by monetary incentives, leading to lower-powered optimal contracts. Nevertheless, image concerns give rise to positive peer effects in the workplace and thereby benefit organizations by alleviating the free-rider problem. Our framework offers a resolution to the team-size puzzle by providing a novel microfoundation for positive team effects based on reputational incentives within the organization. We apply the model to important organizational issues and illustrate how team size, team diversity, and the integration of outsiders enhances work incentives and overall firm performance via the channel of image concerns. We discuss implications for teams, organizations, and corporate culture. Finally, we extend the model to negative as well as hierarchical image concerns. Our findings emphasize that image concerns are a genuine organizational incentive instrument interacting closely with explicit contracts. Altogether, optimal organizational design balances monetary incentives, organizational identity, and reputational image concerns.
- Open Access
- 9 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Allocation of Decision Authority in Three-stage Decision Processes with Applications to Artificial Intelligence in Organizations
We study a three-stage decision process that consists of information acquisition, project choice, and execution of the selected project. A principal wants to choose and implement a proactive project, and hires an agent who chooses a costly effort at the information acquisition stage as well as a costly effort at the execution stage. What the principal can do at the beginning is the allocation of the formal decision authority over project choice, either to herself or the agent. We show that the principal may choose to delegate decision authority to the agent, however unlikely the interest of the agent is to be congruent with her interest, or however competent and experienced she is. We provide several testable predictions. (i) Delegation is more likely as the manager has discretion over both information acquisition and implementation. (ii) Delegation is less likely as opportunities for compromising improve. (iii) Whether or not the parties agree about the status quo matters: In particular, if their preferences about the default decisions differ, the organization is more likely to be decentralized for new project development as their interests are less likely to be congruent. We further discuss the extent to which our results on optimal delegation survive when artificial intelligence (AI) is deployed, distinguishing autonomous and nonautonomous AI. If AI can fully automate information acquisition or execution, delegation cannot be optimal, but it can be optimal if the agent remains responsible for execution. If AI instead supports execution by lowering its cost, delegation can survive.
- 9 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Allocation of Decision Authority in Three-stage Decision Processes with Applications to Artificial Intelligence in Organizations
We study a three-stage decision process that consists of information acquisition, project choice, and execution of the selected project. A principal wants to choose and implement a proactive project, and hires an agent who chooses a costly effort at the information acquisition stage as well as a costly effort at the execution stage. What the principal can do at the beginning is the allocation of the formal decision authority over project choice, either to herself or the agent. We show that the principal may choose to delegate decision authority to the agent, however unlikely the interest of the agent is to be congruent with her interest, or however competent and experienced she is. We provide several testable predictions. (i) Delegation is more likely as the manager has discretion over both information acquisition and implementation. (ii) Delegation is less likely as opportunities for compromising improve. (iii) Whether or not the parties agree about the status quo matters: In particular, if their preferences about the default decisions differ, the organization is more likely to be decentralized for new project development as their interests are less likely to be congruent. We further discuss the extent to which our results on optimal delegation survive when artificial intelligence (AI) is deployed, distinguishing autonomous and nonautonomous AI. If AI can fully automate information acquisition or execution, delegation cannot be optimal, but it can be optimal if the agent remains responsible for execution. If AI instead supports execution by lowering its cost, delegation can survive.
- Open Access
- 2 February 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Incentive Bargaining and Corporate Governance Conference of 2025 Edited Transcript
This is the edited transcript of an international conference based on the substance of the book, Zenichi Shishido & Wei Shen, Incentive Bargaining and Corporate Governance: Comparative Enterprise Law among the US, Japan, and China (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming), which proposes an analytical framework: the firm as the forum of incentive bargaining among the four indispensable capital providers (management and employees as the human capital providers; shareholders and creditors as the monetary capital providers) and the state as the fifth player that participates in the incentive bargaining from outside the forum, basically via management. Panel 1 discusses the pros and cons of the framework and the role of the state in the incentive bargaining, including law-making. Panel 2 discusses the comparative corporate governance of start-ups and listed family firms, including the role of the state. Panel 3 discusses the incentives of human capital providers: management and employees, and comparative board systems. Panel 4 discusses the incentives of monetary capital providers: shareholders and creditors. The final panel is a wrap-up and Q&A.
- 2 February 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessIncentive Bargaining and Corporate Governance Conference of 2025 Edited Transcript
This is the edited transcript of an international conference based on the substance of the book, Zenichi Shishido & Wei Shen, Incentive Bargaining and Corporate Governance: Comparative Enterprise Law among the US, Japan, and China (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming), which proposes an analytical framework: the firm as the forum of incentive bargaining among the four indispensable capital providers (management and employees as the human capital providers; shareholders and creditors as the monetary capital providers) and the state as the fifth player that participates in the incentive bargaining from outside the forum, basically via management. Panel 1 discusses the pros and cons of the framework and the role of the state in the incentive bargaining, including law-making. Panel 2 discusses the comparative corporate governance of start-ups and listed family firms, including the role of the state. Panel 3 discusses the incentives of human capital providers: management and employees, and comparative board systems. Panel 4 discusses the incentives of monetary capital providers: shareholders and creditors. The final panel is a wrap-up and Q&A.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 69 (1) , 446-463
Information Acquisition, Decision Making, and Implementation in Organizations
We study the value of divergence in values and preferences in organizations by combining three stages of a decision process—ex ante information acquisition, interim project choice, and ex post project execution—into a tractable model. A key insight is that our unified model provides predictions different from models without the execution decision stage. We consider an organization that consists of a decision maker who selects a project and an implementer who acquires costly information before project choice and executes the selected project. They have intrinsic and possibly divergent preferences over projects. We show that, although the implementer’s dual role generates a disadvantage of designing conflicts in terms of the implementation motivation, it simultaneously boosts the implementer’s motivation for information acquisition to influence the decision maker’s project choice more under divergent preferences. Our results provide managerial insights that designing conflicts is beneficial only in environments where additional information is sufficiently precise and must be accompanied by a manager who is balanced and incorporating feedback. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy. Funding: This work was financially supported by Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) KAKENHI [Grants 25245031 and 18H03640] toH. Itoh and the JSPS Fellows [Grant 26.5608] to K.Morita. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4373 .
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 69 (1) , 446-463
Information Acquisition, Decision Making, and Implementation in Organizations
We study the value of divergence in values and preferences in organizations by combining three stages of a decision process—ex ante information acquisition, interim project choice, and ex post project execution—into a tractable model. A key insight is that our unified model provides predictions different from models without the execution decision stage. We consider an organization that consists of a decision maker who selects a project and an implementer who acquires costly information before project choice and executes the selected project. They have intrinsic and possibly divergent preferences over projects. We show that, although the implementer’s dual role generates a disadvantage of designing conflicts in terms of the implementation motivation, it simultaneously boosts the implementer’s motivation for information acquisition to influence the decision maker’s project choice more under divergent preferences. Our results provide managerial insights that designing conflicts is beneficial only in environments where additional information is sufficiently precise and must be accompanied by a manager who is balanced and incorporating feedback. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy. Funding: This work was financially supported by Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) KAKENHI [Grants 25245031 and 18H03640] toH. Itoh and the JSPS Fellows [Grant 26.5608] to K.Morita. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4373 .
- 1 January 2016
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 483-517
Moral Hazard and Other-Regarding Preferences
- 1 August 2015
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
- Vol. 7 (3) , 318-346
Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Threat-Point Effect
We investigate whether formal contracts can help in resolving the holdup problem by studying repeated transactions between a seller and a buyer. Contrary to previous findings, we demonstrate that a simple fixed-price contract based on product delivery is of value even when relation-specific investment is purely cooperative. Furthermore, we show that focusing our attention on fixed-price contracts as a form of formal contracts is without loss of generality. The key driving force is a possibility that the relation-specific investment decreases the surplus under no trade. This possibility, although very plausible, has been largely ignored in previous analyses of the holdup problem (JEL C78, D23, D86)
- 1 August 2015
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
- Vol. 7 (3) , 318-346
Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Threat-Point Effect
We investigate whether formal contracts can help in resolving the holdup problem by studying repeated transactions between a seller and a buyer. Contrary to previous findings, we demonstrate that a simple fixed-price contract based on product delivery is of value even when relation-specific investment is purely cooperative. Furthermore, we show that focusing our attention on fixed-price contracts as a form of formal contracts is without loss of generality. The key driving force is a possibility that the relation-specific investment decreases the surplus under no trade. This possibility, although very plausible, has been largely ignored in previous analyses of the holdup problem (JEL C78, D23, D86)
- Open Access
- 30 June 2008
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of the Japanese and International Economies
- Vol. 22 (2) , 207-228
Complementarities among authority, accountability, and monitoring: Evidence from Japanese business groups
- 30 June 2008
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of the Japanese and International Economies
- Vol. 22 (2) , 207-228
Open AccessComplementarities among authority, accountability, and monitoring: Evidence from Japanese business groups
- 15 April 2008
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of the Japanese and International Economies
- Vol. 22 (2) , 143-145
Organizational innovation and corporate performance
- 15 April 2008
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of the Japanese and International Economies
- Vol. 22 (2) , 143-145
Organizational innovation and corporate performance
- Open Access
- 1 January 2005
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Pygmalion Effect: An Agency Model with Reference Dependent Preferences
We attempt to formulate and explain two types of self- fulfilling prophecy, called the Pygmalion effect (if a supervisor thinks her subordinates will succeed, they are more likely to succeed) and the Galatea effect (if a person thinks he will succeed, he is more likely to succeed). To this purpose, we extend a simple agency model with moral hazard and limited liability by introducing a model of reference dependent preferences (RDP) by Kszegi and Rabin (2004). We show that the agent with high expectations about his performance can be induced to choose high effort with low-powered incentives. We then show that the principal's expectation has an important role as an equilibrium selection device.
- 1 January 2005
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Pygmalion Effect: An Agency Model with Reference Dependent Preferences
We attempt to formulate and explain two types of self- fulfilling prophecy, called the Pygmalion effect (if a supervisor thinks her subordinates will succeed, they are more likely to succeed) and the Galatea effect (if a person thinks he will succeed, he is more likely to succeed). To this purpose, we extend a simple agency model with moral hazard and limited liability by introducing a model of reference dependent preferences (RDP) by Kszegi and Rabin (2004). We show that the agent with high expectations about his performance can be induced to choose high effort with low-powered incentives. We then show that the principal's expectation has an important role as an equilibrium selection device.
- 1 March 2004
- Published by Springer Nature in The Japanese Economic Review
- Vol. 55 (1) , 18-45
Moral Hazard and Other‐Regarding Preferences
- 1 March 2004
- Published by Springer Nature in The Japanese Economic Review
- Vol. 55 (1) , 18-45
Moral Hazard and Other‐Regarding Preferences