Open Access
- 28 September 2023
- book chapter
- Published by IOS Press
- p. 867-874
Abstract
There have been a number of attempts to develop a formal definition of causality that accords with our intuitions about what constitutes a cause. Perhaps the best known is the “modified” definition of actual causality, HPm, due to Halpern. In this paper, we argue that HPm gives counterintuitive results for some simple causal models. We propose Dynamic Causality (DC), an alternative semantics for causal models that leads to an alternative definition of causes. DC ascribes the same causes as HPm on the examples of causal models widely discussed in the literature and ascribes intuitive causes for the kinds of causal models we consider. Moreover, we show that the complexity of determining a cause under the DC definition is lower than for the HPm definition.Keywords
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