Equilibria with Vector-Valued Utilities and Preference Information. The Analysis of a Mixed Duopoly
Preprint
- 9 September 2016
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
This paper deals with the equilibria of games when the agents have multiple objectives and therefore, their utilities cannot be represented by a single value, but by a vector containing the various dimensions of the utility. Our approach is based on the incorporation into the model of information about the preferences of the agents, together with additional decision rules. This allows us to identify the equilibria according to this preferential information. The potential application of the theoretical results is shown with an analysis of a mixed oligopoly in which the agents value additional objectives other than their own benefit. These objectives are related to social welfare and to the profit of the industry. The flexibility of our approach provides a general theoretical framework to analyze a wide range of strategic economic models.Keywords
This publication has 20 references indexed in Scilit:
- Think Global, Invest Responsible: Why the Private Equity Industry Goes GreenJournal of Business Ethics, 2012
- Socially responsible firms and endogenous choice of strategic incentivesEconomic Modelling, 2012
- Existence of Pareto Equilibria for Non-Compact Constrained Multi-Criteria GamesJournal of Applied Analysis, 2008
- Nash equilibrium in games with incomplete preferencesEconomic Theory, 2005
- Expected utility theory without the completeness axiomJournal of Economic Theory, 2004
- Existence of Pareto equilibria for constrained multiobjective games in H-spaceComputers & Mathematics with Applications, 2000
- Maxmin expected utility with non-unique priorJournal of Mathematical Economics, 1989
- Games with vector payoffsJournal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 1985
- Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot OutcomesThe Bell Journal of Economics, 1983
- Utility Theory without the Completeness AxiomEconometrica, 1962