Asuncion Zapata
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Asuncion Zapata has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Amparo María Mármol
Universidad de Sevilla
9 shared publications - Luisa Monroy
Universidad de Sevilla
9 shared publications - María Angeles Caraballo
Economics and Economic History Department, University of Seville, Seville, 41018, Spain
8 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 28 September 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in TOP
- Vol. 32 (1) , 83-105
Berge equilibria and the equilibria of the altruistic game
Berge’s notion of equilibrium represents a complementary alternative to the Nash equilibrium when modeling socioeconomic behavior and human interactions. While the notion of Nash equilibrium is based on self-interest, as players seek to maximize their own payoffs given the action of the other players, the idea behind Berge equilibrium is mutual support, as given the action of one of the players, all others select their actions looking for her best interest. However, because of the demanding conditions involved, the existence of Berge equilibria is rarely guaranteed. In this paper, we propose vector-valued normal-form games as a unified framework in which to study and extend the concept of Berge equilibrium. Based on the equilibria of the so-called altruistic game, we introduce new equilibrium concepts which constitute different relaxations of Berge’s notion, although they still retain the underlying idea of mutual support. We establish the links between these new equilibria, Nash equilibrium, Berge equilibrium, and other related concepts already existing in the literature. Our approach has the advantage that it permits the incorporation of preference information to identify the equilibria which are consistent with different altruistic attitudes of the players.
- 28 September 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in TOP
- Vol. 32 (1) , 83-105
Open AccessBerge equilibria and the equilibria of the altruistic game
Berge’s notion of equilibrium represents a complementary alternative to the Nash equilibrium when modeling socioeconomic behavior and human interactions. While the notion of Nash equilibrium is based on self-interest, as players seek to maximize their own payoffs given the action of the other players, the idea behind Berge equilibrium is mutual support, as given the action of one of the players, all others select their actions looking for her best interest. However, because of the demanding conditions involved, the existence of Berge equilibria is rarely guaranteed. In this paper, we propose vector-valued normal-form games as a unified framework in which to study and extend the concept of Berge equilibrium. Based on the equilibria of the so-called altruistic game, we introduce new equilibrium concepts which constitute different relaxations of Berge’s notion, although they still retain the underlying idea of mutual support. We establish the links between these new equilibria, Nash equilibrium, Berge equilibrium, and other related concepts already existing in the literature. Our approach has the advantage that it permits the incorporation of preference information to identify the equilibria which are consistent with different altruistic attitudes of the players.
- 16 July 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 27-35
Environmental Damage Reduction: When Countries Face Conflicting Objectives
- 16 July 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 27-35
Environmental Damage Reduction: When Countries Face Conflicting Objectives
- Open Access
- 1 June 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Psychology
- Vol. 96, 102366
When your gain is also my gain. A class of strategic models with other-regarding agents
- 1 June 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Psychology
- Vol. 96, 102366
Open AccessWhen your gain is also my gain. A class of strategic models with other-regarding agents
- Open Access
- 31 December 2019
- Published by ASEPUMA in Revista Electrónica de Comunicaciones y Trabajos de ASEPUMA
- Vol. 20 (1) , 43-61
Juegos con utilidades multidimensionales y responsabilidad social de las empresas
This paper provides an innovative analysis of strategic models with multidimensional util- ities. A wide range of problems of economic nature can be modeled more realistically by this setting, in which several objectives must be taken into account. The traditional treatment of economic models is characterized by the principle of individual rationality. However, the evidence shows that people do follow not only their own interests, but also they often worry about the welfare of others. We analyse Cournot's model of oligopoly by considering a vector utility function and with a perspective of the firm based on principles of social responsibility. We conclude that firms can achieve equilibria in which the social cost is reduced.
- 31 December 2019
- Published by ASEPUMA in Revista Electrónica de Comunicaciones y Trabajos de ASEPUMA
- Vol. 20 (1) , 43-61
Open AccessJuegos con utilidades multidimensionales y responsabilidad social de las empresas
This paper provides an innovative analysis of strategic models with multidimensional util- ities. A wide range of problems of economic nature can be modeled more realistically by this setting, in which several objectives must be taken into account. The traditional treatment of economic models is characterized by the principle of individual rationality. However, the evidence shows that people do follow not only their own interests, but also they often worry about the welfare of others. We analyse Cournot's model of oligopoly by considering a vector utility function and with a perspective of the firm based on principles of social responsibility. We conclude that firms can achieve equilibria in which the social cost is reduced.
- 12 December 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Group Decision and Negotiation
- Vol. 28 (2) , 415-432
A Maxmin Approach for the Equilibria of Vector-Valued Games
- 12 December 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Group Decision and Negotiation
- Vol. 28 (2) , 415-432
A Maxmin Approach for the Equilibria of Vector-Valued Games
- 28 December 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Central European Journal of Operations Research
- Vol. 27 (4) , 937-952
Hurwicz’s criterion and the equilibria of duopoly models
- 28 December 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Central European Journal of Operations Research
- Vol. 27 (4) , 937-952
Hurwicz’s criterion and the equilibria of duopoly models
- 27 March 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 83 (3) , 365-383
Equilibria with vector-valued utilities and preference information. The analysis of a mixed duopoly
- 27 March 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 83 (3) , 365-383
Equilibria with vector-valued utilities and preference information. The analysis of a mixed duopoly
- 9 December 2016
- Published by Wiley in Metroeconomica
- Vol. 68 (4) , 947-965
Agents with other‐regarding preferences in the commons
We present a unified approach to study the problem of the commons for agents with other‐regarding preferences. This situation is modeled as a game with vector‐valued utilities. Several types of agents are characterized depending on the importance assigned to the components of their utility functions. We obtain the set of equilibria of the game with two types of agents, pro‐social and pro‐self, and some refinements of this set for conservative agents. The most relevant result is that only a pro‐social agent is required to avoid the tragedy of the commons, regardless of the behavior of the rest of the agents.
- 9 December 2016
- Published by Wiley in Metroeconomica
- Vol. 68 (4) , 947-965
Agents with other‐regarding preferences in the commons
We present a unified approach to study the problem of the commons for agents with other‐regarding preferences. This situation is modeled as a game with vector‐valued utilities. Several types of agents are characterized depending on the importance assigned to the components of their utility functions. We obtain the set of equilibria of the game with two types of agents, pro‐social and pro‐self, and some refinements of this set for conservative agents. The most relevant result is that only a pro‐social agent is required to avoid the tragedy of the commons, regardless of the behavior of the rest of the agents.
- Open Access
- 9 September 2016
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Equilibria with Vector-Valued Utilities and Preference Information. The Analysis of a Mixed Duopoly
This paper deals with the equilibria of games when the agents have multiple objectives and therefore, their utilities cannot be represented by a single value, but by a vector containing the various dimensions of the utility. Our approach is based on the incorporation into the model of information about the preferences of the agents, together with additional decision rules. This allows us to identify the equilibria according to this preferential information. The potential application of the theoretical results is shown with an analysis of a mixed oligopoly in which the agents value additional objectives other than their own benefit. These objectives are related to social welfare and to the profit of the industry. The flexibility of our approach provides a general theoretical framework to analyze a wide range of strategic economic models.
- 9 September 2016
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessEquilibria with Vector-Valued Utilities and Preference Information. The Analysis of a Mixed Duopoly
This paper deals with the equilibria of games when the agents have multiple objectives and therefore, their utilities cannot be represented by a single value, but by a vector containing the various dimensions of the utility. Our approach is based on the incorporation into the model of information about the preferences of the agents, together with additional decision rules. This allows us to identify the equilibria according to this preferential information. The potential application of the theoretical results is shown with an analysis of a mixed oligopoly in which the agents value additional objectives other than their own benefit. These objectives are related to social welfare and to the profit of the industry. The flexibility of our approach provides a general theoretical framework to analyze a wide range of strategic economic models.
- Open Access
- 14 January 2016
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Equilibria with Vector-Valued Utilities and Preference Information
This paper deals with the equilibria of games when the agents have multiple objectives and therefore, their utilities cannot be represented by a single value, but by a vector containing the various dimensions of the utility. Our approach is based on the incorporation into the model of information about the preferences of the agents, together with additional decision rules. This allows us to identify the equilibria according to this preferential information. The flexibility of our approach provides a general theoretical framework to analyze a wide range of strategic economic models.
- 14 January 2016
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessEquilibria with Vector-Valued Utilities and Preference Information
This paper deals with the equilibria of games when the agents have multiple objectives and therefore, their utilities cannot be represented by a single value, but by a vector containing the various dimensions of the utility. Our approach is based on the incorporation into the model of information about the preferences of the agents, together with additional decision rules. This allows us to identify the equilibria according to this preferential information. The flexibility of our approach provides a general theoretical framework to analyze a wide range of strategic economic models.