A volatility-based theory of fiscal union desirability
- 1 April 2014
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 112, 1-11
Abstract
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Funding Information
- MEC (ECO2011-30323-C03-01)
- EUI
- Nova Forum
- Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia
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