Jaime Luque
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Jaime Luque has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Gianluca Marcato
Department of Real Estate and Planning, Henley Business School University of Reading Reading UK
1 shared publication - José Tavares
Universidade Nova de Lisboa
1 shared publication Kian Starsberg
1 shared publication- Massimo Morelli
Bocconi University
1 shared publication Sophia Göppinger
Department of Law, Economics and Humanities, ESCP Business School Madrid Spain
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 19 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Who Pays for Price Discovery?
Financial information is costly to produce but cheap to share, and whoever shares it also leaks it: subscribers' trades push their signal into prices. We study who pays for price discovery when a xed-cost, nonrival signal is nanced collectively in a GrossmanStiglitz market. Funding capacity, the subscriber base times each subscriber's willingness to pay, is hump-shaped, generating a critical mass, tipping, and a stable membership equilibrium. Governance matters: a for-prot seller restricts access at the revenue peak, while a member-nanced club disseminates more broadly and produces a more informative price, yet lowers total investor surplus under a transparent, deliberately partial benchmark. With competing providers, price leakage across venues makes information provision a natural monopoly under either governance form. Finally, we replace the exogenous noise traders with hedgers, traders who sell the asset to reduce the risk of their random endowments, so that the welfare of every agent in the economy is counted. In that economy, information production that each subscriber privately nds worth its fee can nonetheless reduce the welfare of all market participants. The results speak to exchange demutualization, market-data pricing, and the nancing of research.
- 19 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessWho Pays for Price Discovery?
Financial information is costly to produce but cheap to share, and whoever shares it also leaks it: subscribers' trades push their signal into prices. We study who pays for price discovery when a xed-cost, nonrival signal is nanced collectively in a GrossmanStiglitz market. Funding capacity, the subscriber base times each subscriber's willingness to pay, is hump-shaped, generating a critical mass, tipping, and a stable membership equilibrium. Governance matters: a for-prot seller restricts access at the revenue peak, while a member-nanced club disseminates more broadly and produces a more informative price, yet lowers total investor surplus under a transparent, deliberately partial benchmark. With competing providers, price leakage across venues makes information provision a natural monopoly under either governance form. Finally, we replace the exogenous noise traders with hedgers, traders who sell the asset to reduce the risk of their random endowments, so that the welfare of every agent in the economy is counted. In that economy, information production that each subscriber privately nds worth its fee can nonetheless reduce the welfare of all market participants. The results speak to exchange demutualization, market-data pricing, and the nancing of research.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Beyond Well-Intentioned Housing Policies: The Adverse Effects of Rent Control
In order to respond to their electorate's demands for affordable housing, many politicians turn to rent control. In this "impact paper", we argue that in reality undesirable effects take precedence and other avenues must therefore be considered to respond to the housing crisis.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessBeyond Well-Intentioned Housing Policies: The Adverse Effects of Rent Control
In order to respond to their electorate's demands for affordable housing, many politicians turn to rent control. In this "impact paper", we argue that in reality undesirable effects take precedence and other avenues must therefore be considered to respond to the housing crisis.
- Open Access
- 25 June 2024
- Published by Wiley in Real Estate Economics
- Vol. 52 (5) , 1197-1225
Property management technology adoption in the short‐term housing rental market
We show evidence of the impact providing information on market conditions (supply growth, demand patterns, pricing trends, and competitor rates) on pricing in the short‐term rental market. Using a sample of 2196 housing units over 18 months available on Airbnb in Madrid, Spain, we observe property managers' adoption of this technology at different points in time for 16% of our observations. Our propensity score matching estimates support the evidence of greater market transparency obtained through the adoption of this technology, with a significant increase in revenues obtained through a reduced average daily price and increased occupancy. Our results are robust to several model selections dealing with a potential endogeneity issue. We also show some preliminary evidence of property managers increasingly engaging in dynamic pricing after adopting this technology. Mainly, revenue growth seems to be generated through a small price drop leading to a rise in occupancy at the top end of the price distribution rather than at the bottom end, where a significant and much higher price drop is not able to generate the necessary occupancy growth to obtain an overall increase in revenues.
- 25 June 2024
- Published by Wiley in Real Estate Economics
- Vol. 52 (5) , 1197-1225
Open AccessProperty management technology adoption in the short‐term housing rental market
We show evidence of the impact providing information on market conditions (supply growth, demand patterns, pricing trends, and competitor rates) on pricing in the short‐term rental market. Using a sample of 2196 housing units over 18 months available on Airbnb in Madrid, Spain, we observe property managers' adoption of this technology at different points in time for 16% of our observations. Our propensity score matching estimates support the evidence of greater market transparency obtained through the adoption of this technology, with a significant increase in revenues obtained through a reduced average daily price and increased occupancy. Our results are robust to several model selections dealing with a potential endogeneity issue. We also show some preliminary evidence of property managers increasingly engaging in dynamic pricing after adopting this technology. Mainly, revenue growth seems to be generated through a small price drop leading to a rise in occupancy at the top end of the price distribution rather than at the bottom end, where a significant and much higher price drop is not able to generate the necessary occupancy growth to obtain an overall increase in revenues.
- 1 January 2015
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 45-49
Subcenters
- 1 April 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 112, 1-11
A volatility-based theory of fiscal union desirability
- 1 April 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 112, 1-11
A volatility-based theory of fiscal union desirability