Managerial shareholding policies and retention of vested equity incentives
Authors:
- Piotr KorczakPKPiotr Korczak
- Xicheng LiuXLXicheng Liu
- 1 June 2014
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Empirical Finance
- Vol. 27, 116-129
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 31 references indexed in Scilit:
- Structural models and endogeneity in corporate finance: The link between managerial ownership and corporate performanceJournal of Financial Economics, 2012
- Stock and Option Grants with Performance-based Vesting ProvisionsThe Review of Financial Studies, 2010
- The Manipulation of Executive Stock Option Exercise Strategies: Information Timing and BackdatingThe Journal of Finance, 2009
- Explicit relative performance evaluation in performance-vested equity grantsReview of Accounting Studies, 2009
- CEO incentives and earnings managementJournal of Financial Economics, 2006
- Ownership structure, managerial behavior and corporate valueJournal of Corporate Finance, 2005
- Private Information, Earnings Manipulations, and Executive Stock-Option ExercisesThe Accounting Review, 2004
- Executive Compensation as an Agency ProblemJournal of Economic Perspectives, 2003
- Performance consequences of mandatory increases in executive stock ownershipJournal of Financial Economics, 2002
- The Prince and the Pauper? CEO Pay in the United States and United KingdomThe Economic Journal, 2000