RENT‐SEEKING FIRMS, CONSUMER GROUPS, AND THE SOCIAL COSTS OF MONOPOLY
- 2 July 1999
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 37 (3) , 541-553
Abstract
Do consumers' consumer‐surplus (CS)–defending activities increase the social costs of monopoly compared to when consumers are inactive? Given just one rent‐seeking firm, consumers ' CS‐defending activities generally increase the social costs of monopoly, but given two or more rent‐seeking firms, such activities generally reduce the social costs. (JEL D72, L12)Keywords
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