Manipulation and Learning by Peers in Online Marketplaces
Preprint
- 20 March 2020
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
We study a context in which a seller can increase the perceived value of her product by a costly manipulative action, and buyers' collective learning can contrast the seller's manipulation. Each buyer needs to face documentation (effort) costs to understand product value. A buyer alone is never willing to face the cost of effort, as her documentation activity has no impact on the seller's choices. The intermediation of a platform induces the buyers to exert effort, thereby reducing manipulation. The platform can direct the learning activity by developing a peer-review system or only allowing for individual learning. The choice between the two environments depends on (i) the precisions of the signals that each buyer receives and (ii) the manipulative ability of the seller.Keywords
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