ECElias Carroni

Elias Carroni

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Elias Carroni has a total of 17 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Quasi-Collusive Equilibria in Two-Sided Hotelling Models

    by Emanuele Bacchiega, Elias Carroni, Alessandro Fedele

    The Hotelling model is widely used to analyze platform competition in two-sided markets. Under standard assumptions, namely, sufficiently high stand-alone utility and strong product differentiation relative to cross-group externalities, the model yields a competitive equilibrium with two active platforms. Relaxing either assumption typically leads to corner outcomes such as market tipping or uncovered markets. This paper shows that, when the full parameter space is analyzed, an additional class of equilibria emerges: market-sharing kinked-demand equilibria (Mérel and Sexton, 2010), at which platforms soften competition and replicate a collusive outcome. These findings extend the traditional two-sided Hotelling framework by highlighting market environments, common in digital settings, in which cross-group externalities outweigh both differentiation and stand-alone utility.


  • Does costly persuasion signal quality?

    by Elias Carroni, Luca Ferrari, Giuseppe Pignataro

  • Top Cited Papers

    Superstar Exclusivity in Two-Sided Markets

    by Elias Carroni, Leonardo Madio, Shiva Shekhar

    In most platform environments, the exclusive provision of premium content from leading creators (superstars) is used as a strategy to boost user participation and secure a competitive edge vis-à-vis rivals. In this article, we study the impact of superstar exclusive content provision on platform competition and complementors’ homing decisions. Two competing platforms facilitate interactions between consumers and suppliers, of which the latter are identified by the superstar and a fringe of complementors (e.g., independent developers, amateurs). When platform competition is intense, more consumers become affiliated with the platform favored by superstar exclusivity. This mechanism is self-reinforcing as it generates an entry cascade of complementors, and some complementors single home on the favored platform. We find that cross-group externalities are key in shaping market outcomes. First, exclusivity benefits complementors and might make consumers better off when cross-group externalities are large enough. Second, contrary to conventional wisdom, vertical integration (platform-superstar) may make exclusivity less likely than vertical separation under reasonable conditions. Finally, we discuss implications for the strategies of platform owners, managers of superstars and complementors, and antitrust enforcers. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy. Funding: L. Madio gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Economic and Social Research Council [Grant ES/J500215/1], the UCLouvain “Move-in” Fellowship Programme, the European Research Council under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme [Grant 670494], and the Unicredit & Universities Foscolo Europe Fellowship. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4720 .


  • Price signaling with salient-thinking consumers

    by Elias Carroni, Andrea Mantovani, Antonio Minniti


  • Open Access

    Technology adoption and specialized labor

    by Elias Carroni, Marco Delogu, Giuseppe Pulina


  • Open Access

    Does Costly Persuasion Signal Quality?

    by Elias Carroni, Luca Ferrari, Giuseppe Pignataro

    This article investigates how a privately-informed seller could signal her type by gathering information about the buyer's match value. We study two alternative ways to obtain information. In the first one, labeled information acquisition, the seller can acquire exogenous signals by facing a fixed acquisition cost. In the second one, on top of the fixed cost, the seller faces an additional designing cost based on mutual information to endogenously reduce uncertainty on the match value (information design). At first glance, bearing such cost may seem not convenient for the seller. However, we show that when the designing cost is relatively high, the parameter region in which separation can occur is larger under information design. When this cost is low, the separation cannot emerge under information design. The non-monotone relationship between the designing cost and separating outcomes shows that a seller's ability to provide match information is not necessarily associated with more precise quality information.


  • Bring a Friend! Privately or Publicly?

    by Elias Carroni, Paolo Pin, Simone Righi

    We study the optimal referral strategy of a seller and its relationship with the type of communication channels among consumers. The seller faces a partially uninformed population of consumers, interconnected through a directed social network. In the network, the seller offers rewards to informed consumers (influencers) conditional on inducing purchases by uninformed consumers (influenced). Rewards are needed to bear a communication cost and to induce word of mouth (WOM) either privately (cost per contact) or publicly (fixed cost to inform all friends). From the seller’s viewpoint, eliciting Private WOM is more costly than eliciting Public WOM. We investigate (1) the incentives for the seller to move to a denser network, inducing either Private or Public WOM, and (2) the optimal mix between the two types of communication. A denser network is found to be always better not only for information diffusion but also for seller’s profits, as long as Private WOM is concerned. Differently, under Public WOM, the seller may prefer an environment with less competition between informed consumers, and the presence of highly connected influencers (hubs) is the main driver to make network density beneficial to profits. When the seller is able to discriminate between Private and Public WOM, the optimal strategy is to cheaply incentivize the more connected people to pass on the information publicly and then offer a high bonus for Private WOM. This paper was accepted by Juanjuan Zhang, marketing.


  • Open Access

    Manipulation and Learning by Peers in Online Marketplaces

    by Elias Carroni, Giuseppe Pignataro, Alessandro Tampieri

    We study a context in which a seller can increase the perceived value of her product by a costly manipulative action, and buyers' collective learning can contrast the seller's manipulation. Each buyer needs to face documentation (effort) costs to understand product value. A buyer alone is never willing to face the cost of effort, as her documentation activity has no impact on the seller's choices. The intermediation of a platform induces the buyers to exert effort, thereby reducing manipulation. The platform can direct the learning activity by developing a peer-review system or only allowing for individual learning. The choice between the two environments depends on (i) the precisions of the signals that each buyer receives and (ii) the manipulative ability of the seller.


  • Open Access

    Salience and Information Asymmetry

    by Elias Carroni, Andrea Mantovani, Antonio Minniti

    In this paper we study optimal price setting by firms when consumers are incompletely informed about product quality and their purchasing decisions are distorted by salient thinking. Consumer attention can be directed towards the product attribute - quality or price - that stands out in the market. We show that salience renders separation less likely to occur. When a dominant firm faces a competitive fringe, separation takes place only if the salience bias is moderate. Instead, if the salience bias is sufficiently strong, the dominant firm prefers to set a low price to mitigate the detrimental effects of price salience even though this strategy may not lead to separation. Our analysis shows that the interplay between asymmetric information and salient thinking could explain why price differences observed in the market do not always reflect quality gaps.


  • Open Access

    The price of discovering your needs online

    by Elias Carroni, Luca Ferrari, Simone Righi