Average monotonic cooperative games with nontransferable utility
Open Access
- 1 June 2023
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Mathematical Methods of Operations Research
- Vol. 97 (3) , 383-390
Abstract
A non-negative transferable utility (TU) game is average monotonic if there exists a non-negative vector according to which the relative worth is not decreasing when enlarging the coalition. We generalize this definition to the nontransferable utility (NTU) case. It is shown that an average monotonic NTU game shares several properties with an average monotonic TU game. In particular it has a special core element and there exists a population monotonic allocation scheme. We show that an NTU bankruptcy game is average monotonic with respect to the claims vector.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 7 references indexed in Scilit:
- The Bilateral Consistent Prekernel, the Core, and NTU Bankruptcy ProblemsMathematics of Operations Research, 2003
- Average Monotonic Cooperative GamesGames and Economic Behavior, 2001
- The MC-value for monotonic NTU-gamesInternational Journal of Game Theory, 1998
- Bargaining and ValueEconometrica, 1996
- Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utilityGames and Economic Behavior, 1990
- Cores and large cores when population variesInternational Journal of Game Theory, 1990
- A problem of rights arbitration from the TalmudMathematical Social Sciences, 1982