Peter Sudhölter
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Peter Sudhölter has a total of 50 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Bezalel Peleg
Institute of Mathematics and The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Feldman Building, Givat Ram, 91904 Jerusalem, Israel
22 shared publications- Michel Grabisch
Centre d’Économie de la Sorbonne
6 shared publications - Francesc Llerena
Rovira i Virgili University
5 shared publications - Pedro Calleja
University of Barcelona - Department of Actuarial, Financial and Economic Mathematics
5 shared publications J. Rosenmüller
Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW), University of Bielefeld, D-33615 Bielefeld, Germany DE
4 shared publications- Bezalel Peleg
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 27 February 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 53 (2) , 295-297
Correction to: Hart–Mas-Colell consistency and the core in convex games
- 27 February 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 53 (2) , 295-297
Open AccessCorrection to: Hart–Mas-Colell consistency and the core in convex games
- 15 July 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 125, 61-64
Remarks on solidarity in bankruptcy problems when agents merge or split
- 15 July 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 125, 61-64
Remarks on solidarity in bankruptcy problems when agents merge or split
- Open Access
- 1 June 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Mathematical Methods of Operations Research
- Vol. 97 (3) , 383-390
Average monotonic cooperative games with nontransferable utility
A non-negative transferable utility (TU) game is average monotonic if there exists a non-negative vector according to which the relative worth is not decreasing when enlarging the coalition. We generalize this definition to the nontransferable utility (NTU) case. It is shown that an average monotonic NTU game shares several properties with an average monotonic TU game. In particular it has a special core element and there exists a population monotonic allocation scheme. We show that an NTU bankruptcy game is average monotonic with respect to the claims vector.
- 1 June 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Mathematical Methods of Operations Research
- Vol. 97 (3) , 383-390
Open AccessAverage monotonic cooperative games with nontransferable utility
A non-negative transferable utility (TU) game is average monotonic if there exists a non-negative vector according to which the relative worth is not decreasing when enlarging the coalition. We generalize this definition to the nontransferable utility (NTU) case. It is shown that an average monotonic NTU game shares several properties with an average monotonic TU game. In particular it has a special core element and there exists a population monotonic allocation scheme. We show that an NTU bankruptcy game is average monotonic with respect to the claims vector.
- 26 January 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 52 (3) , 687-701
Axiomatic characterizations of the core without consistency
- 26 January 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 52 (3) , 687-701
Axiomatic characterizations of the core without consistency
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
A Note on Solidarity in Bankruptcy Problems when Agents Merge or Split
We explore the relationship between non-manipulability via merging (splitting) and strong non-manipulability via merging (splitting). We show that although, in general, these non-manipulability properties are not equivalent, under the principle of solidarity, fulfilled by a wide range of bankruptcy rules including parametric rules, they coincide.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessA Note on Solidarity in Bankruptcy Problems when Agents Merge or Split
We explore the relationship between non-manipulability via merging (splitting) and strong non-manipulability via merging (splitting). We show that although, in general, these non-manipulability properties are not equivalent, under the principle of solidarity, fulfilled by a wide range of bankruptcy rules including parametric rules, they coincide.
- Open Access
- 29 March 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
On Manipulability in Financial Systems
We investigate manipulability in the setting of financial systems by considering two weak forms of immunity: non-manipulability via merging and nonmanipulability via splitting. Not surprisingly, non-manipulability via splitting is incompatible with some basic axioms: claim boundedness, limited liability, and absolute priority. Outstandingly, we introduce a large class of financial rules that are immune to manipulations via merging. This class includes the proportional financial rule but also financial rules in accordance with parametric bankruptcy rules fulfilling non-manipulability via merging.
- 29 March 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessOn Manipulability in Financial Systems
We investigate manipulability in the setting of financial systems by considering two weak forms of immunity: non-manipulability via merging and nonmanipulability via splitting. Not surprisingly, non-manipulability via splitting is incompatible with some basic axioms: claim boundedness, limited liability, and absolute priority. Outstandingly, we introduce a large class of financial rules that are immune to manipulations via merging. This class includes the proportional financial rule but also financial rules in accordance with parametric bankruptcy rules fulfilling non-manipulability via merging.
- Open Access
Axiomatic characterizations of the core without consistency
A TU game is totally positive if it is a linear combination of unanimity games with nonnegative coefficients. We show that the core on each cone of convex games that contains the set of totally positive games is characterized by the traditional properties Pareto efficiency, additivity (ADD), individual rationality, and the null-player property together with one new property, called unanimity requiring that the solution, when applied to a unanimity gameon an arbitrary coalition, allows to distribute the entire available amount of money to each player of this coalition. We also show that the foregoing characterization can be generalized to the domain of balanced games by replacing ADD by “ADD on the set of totally positive games plus super-additivity (SUPA) in general”. Adding converse SUPA allows to characterize the core on arbitrary domains of TU games that contain the set of all totallypositive games. Converse SUPA requires a vector to be a member of the solution to a game whenever, when adding a totally positive game such that the sum becomes totally additive, the sum of the vector and each solution element of the totally positive game belongs to the solution of the aggregate game. Unlike in traditional characterizations of the core, our results do not use consistency properties.
Open AccessAxiomatic characterizations of the core without consistency
A TU game is totally positive if it is a linear combination of unanimity games with nonnegative coefficients. We show that the core on each cone of convex games that contains the set of totally positive games is characterized by the traditional properties Pareto efficiency, additivity (ADD), individual rationality, and the null-player property together with one new property, called unanimity requiring that the solution, when applied to a unanimity gameon an arbitrary coalition, allows to distribute the entire available amount of money to each player of this coalition. We also show that the foregoing characterization can be generalized to the domain of balanced games by replacing ADD by “ADD on the set of totally positive games plus super-additivity (SUPA) in general”. Adding converse SUPA allows to characterize the core on arbitrary domains of TU games that contain the set of all totallypositive games. Converse SUPA requires a vector to be a member of the solution to a game whenever, when adding a totally positive game such that the sum becomes totally additive, the sum of the vector and each solution element of the totally positive game belongs to the solution of the aggregate game. Unlike in traditional characterizations of the core, our results do not use consistency properties.
- 29 October 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Mathematical Programming
- Vol. 203 (1-2) , 801-826
Characterization of TU games with stable cores by nested balancedness
- 29 October 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Mathematical Programming
- Vol. 203 (1-2) , 801-826
Characterization of TU games with stable cores by nested balancedness
- Open Access
- 6 October 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 51 (2) , 413-429
Hart–Mas-Colell consistency and the core in convex games
This paper formally introduces Hart–Mas-Colell consistency for general (possibly multi-valued) solutions for cooperative games with transferable utility. This notion is used to axiomatically characterize the core on the domain of convex games. Moreover, we characterize all nonempty solutions satisfying individual rationality, anonymity, scale covariance, superadditivity, weak Hart–Mas-Colell consistency, and converse Hart–Mas-Colell consistency. This family consists of (a) the Shapley value, (b) all homothetic images of the core with the Shapley value as center of homothety and with positive ratios of homothety not larger than one, and (c) their relative interiors.
- 6 October 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 51 (2) , 413-429
Open AccessHart–Mas-Colell consistency and the core in convex games
This paper formally introduces Hart–Mas-Colell consistency for general (possibly multi-valued) solutions for cooperative games with transferable utility. This notion is used to axiomatically characterize the core on the domain of convex games. Moreover, we characterize all nonempty solutions satisfying individual rationality, anonymity, scale covariance, superadditivity, weak Hart–Mas-Colell consistency, and converse Hart–Mas-Colell consistency. This family consists of (a) the Shapley value, (b) all homothetic images of the core with the Shapley value as center of homothety and with positive ratios of homothety not larger than one, and (c) their relative interiors.
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 109, 45-51
Constrained welfare egalitarianism in surplus-sharing problems
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 109, 45-51
Constrained welfare egalitarianism in surplus-sharing problems