When Are Local Incumbents Held Accountable for Government Performance? Evidence from US School Districts
- 15 November 2016
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Legislative Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 42 (3) , 421-448
Abstract
Do voters hold local officials accountable for government performance? Using over a decade of panel data on school district elections and academic achievement in California, I causally identify the effect of test score changes on school board incumbent re‐election rates and show that incumbents are more likely to win re‐election when test scores improve in their districts—but only in presidential election years. This effect disappears in midterm and off‐years, indicating that election timing might facilitate local government accountability.Keywords
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