Strategic, Sincere and Heuristic Voting under Four Election Rules: An Experimental Study

Authors:
  • ABAndré Blais
    André Blais
  • JLJean-François Laslier
    Jean-François Laslier
  • NSNicolas Sauger
    Nicolas Sauger
  • KSKarine Van Der Straeten
    Karine Van Der Straeten

  • 1 January 2009
Abstract
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked preferences we find that the rational choice theory provides very good predictions of actual individual behavior in one-round and approval voting elections, but fares poorly in explaining vote choice under two-round elections. We conclude that voters behave strategically as far as strategic computations are not too demanding, in which case they rely on simple heuristics (in two-round elections) or they just vote sincerely (in single transferable vote elections).