Optimal Cooperation-Trap Strategies for the Iterated Rock-Paper-Scissors Game
Open Access
- 29 October 2014
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 9 (10) , e111278
Abstract
In an iterated non-cooperative game, if all the players act to maximize their individual accumulated payoff, the system as a whole usually converges to a Nash equilibrium that poorly benefits any player. Here we show that such an undesirable destiny is avoidable in an iterated Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) game involving two rational players, X and Y. Player X has the option of proactively adopting a cooperation-trap strategy, which enforces complete cooperation from the rational player Y and leads to a highly beneficial and maximally fair situation to both players. That maximal degree of cooperation is achievable in such a competitive system with cyclic dominance of actions may stimulate further theoretical and empirical studies on how to resolve conflicts and enhance cooperation in human societies.Keywords
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