Efficiency and budget balance in general quasi-linear domains
Authors:
- Swaprava NathSNSwaprava Nath
- Tuomas SandholmTSTuomas Sandholm
- 1 January 2019
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 113, 673-693
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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Funding Information
- Fulbright-Nehru Postdoctoral Fellowship
- Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur (2017198)
- National Science Foundation (1320620)
- National Science Foundation (1546752)
- National Science Foundation (1617590)
- ARO (W911NF-16-1-0061)
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