Governance, board inattention, and the appointment of overconfident CEOs
Authors:
- Suman BanerjeeSBSuman Banerjee
- Lili DaiLDLili Dai
- Mark Humphery-JennerMHMark Humphery-Jenner
- Vikram NandaVNVikram Nanda
- 1 April 2020
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Banking & Finance
- Vol. 113
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- Australian Research Council
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