Mark Humphery-Jenner
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Mark Humphery-Jenner has a total of 30 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Suman Banerjee
5 shared publications- Vikram K. Nanda
University of Texas at Dallas - School of Management - Department of Finance & Managerial Economics
4 shared publications Jo-Ann Suchard
3 shared publications- Jo-Ann Suchard
UNSW Sydney
3 shared publications - Ronan G. Powell
University College Dublin (UCD) - Michael Smurfit Graduate School of Business
2 shared publications Ronan Powell
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 11 November 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Submission on the Digital Duty of Care Bill Senate Environment and Communications Legislation Committee
The prosperity institute is dedicated to improving Australian prosperity and increasing individual freedom and liberty. It is not associated with any political party or advocacy organization. Mark Humphery-Jenner operates Prosperity Institute and is the author of this submission. He founded Otso Capital, is an Associate Professor of Finance at UNSW, and sits on the Management Committee of Sydney Angels and Investment Advisory Committee of Australian Vision Research. He has written more than 40 peer reviewed articles in finance and law journals.
- 11 November 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessSubmission on the Digital Duty of Care Bill Senate Environment and Communications Legislation Committee
The prosperity institute is dedicated to improving Australian prosperity and increasing individual freedom and liberty. It is not associated with any political party or advocacy organization. Mark Humphery-Jenner operates Prosperity Institute and is the author of this submission. He founded Otso Capital, is an Associate Professor of Finance at UNSW, and sits on the Management Committee of Sydney Angels and Investment Advisory Committee of Australian Vision Research. He has written more than 40 peer reviewed articles in finance and law journals.
- 11 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 315-321
Diversification in Private Equity
- 16 November 2024
- Published by Wiley in Accounting & Finance
- Vol. 65 (1) , 1047-1058
Accredited investor tests: How to balance, access, entrepreneurial funding, and investor protection?
Regulators seek to balance investor protection with the costs of that protection. This often leads to a distinction between “accredited” and “retail” investors. Only “accredited” investors can invest in certain “risky” or “illiquid” assets, including start‐ups and wholesale funds. But what should be the “bar” to be classified as “accredited”? Should people be able to qualify via income, wealth, or education? Should they be able to self‐certify? Thus, this article considers the situation in the US, UK, and Australia and argues in favour of letting people qualify via wealth, income, and education and being able to self‐certify.
- 16 November 2024
- Published by Wiley in Accounting & Finance
- Vol. 65 (1) , 1047-1058
Accredited investor tests: How to balance, access, entrepreneurial funding, and investor protection?
Regulators seek to balance investor protection with the costs of that protection. This often leads to a distinction between “accredited” and “retail” investors. Only “accredited” investors can invest in certain “risky” or “illiquid” assets, including start‐ups and wholesale funds. But what should be the “bar” to be classified as “accredited”? Should people be able to qualify via income, wealth, or education? Should they be able to self‐certify? Thus, this article considers the situation in the US, UK, and Australia and argues in favour of letting people qualify via wealth, income, and education and being able to self‐certify.
- 15 May 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Statute Law Review
- Vol. 45 (2)
Legislating Against Misinformation: Lessons from Australia’s Misinformation Bill
Misinformation is decried in today’s discourse. Governments have been tempted to attempt to restrict or outlaw it. This may not be possible where there are Constitutional protections for free speech. However, many countries lack rigorous protections. Australia shows us an approach where there are limited protections. It is a cautionary tale, exacerbating ‘agency conflicts’ both at the political and regulatory level and at the corporate level. The Australian government has attempted to curtail ‘misinformation’ and ‘disinformation’ through the proposed ‘Communications Legislation Amendment (Combatting Misinformation and Disinformation) Bill 2023’. But, in so doing, the proposed bill casts a wide net, has unintended consequences, and unnecessarily chills free speech and intellectual inquiry. Ironically, the Bill also exempts the government’s own communications from attempts to curtail misinformation. The Bill would also incentivize corporate overreach by penalizing firms for inadvertently allowing ‘misinformation’, but not penalizing them for suppressing true information. The corporate governance literature gives additional insights into the value destruction that such a Bill could cause. The Bill’s failures provide lessons for any government that seeks to legislate against misinformation.
- 15 May 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Statute Law Review
- Vol. 45 (2)
Legislating Against Misinformation: Lessons from Australia’s Misinformation Bill
Misinformation is decried in today’s discourse. Governments have been tempted to attempt to restrict or outlaw it. This may not be possible where there are Constitutional protections for free speech. However, many countries lack rigorous protections. Australia shows us an approach where there are limited protections. It is a cautionary tale, exacerbating ‘agency conflicts’ both at the political and regulatory level and at the corporate level. The Australian government has attempted to curtail ‘misinformation’ and ‘disinformation’ through the proposed ‘Communications Legislation Amendment (Combatting Misinformation and Disinformation) Bill 2023’. But, in so doing, the proposed bill casts a wide net, has unintended consequences, and unnecessarily chills free speech and intellectual inquiry. Ironically, the Bill also exempts the government’s own communications from attempts to curtail misinformation. The Bill would also incentivize corporate overreach by penalizing firms for inadvertently allowing ‘misinformation’, but not penalizing them for suppressing true information. The corporate governance literature gives additional insights into the value destruction that such a Bill could cause. The Bill’s failures provide lessons for any government that seeks to legislate against misinformation.
- Top Cited Papers
- 16 April 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Banking & Finance
- Vol. 163
Of fogs and bogs: Does litigation risk make financial reports less readable?
- 16 April 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Banking & Finance
- Vol. 163
Top Cited PapersOf fogs and bogs: Does litigation risk make financial reports less readable?
- 12 October 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-6
Private Equity and Venture Capital Markets in Asia
- 7 August 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-6
Diversification in Private Equity
- 6 February 2022
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Empirical Legal Studies
- Vol. 19 (1) , 135-188
Powerful CEOs and Corporate Governance
Excessive CEO power is often regarded as value‐destroying. We use a quasi‐exogenous regulatory shock to analyze whether improved governance helps to channel firms with powerful CEOs toward more value‐enhancing corporate policies. We use the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act and NYSE/NASDAQ listing rules and focus on firms that were required to improve governance. We find that postregulation firms led by powerful CEOs increase innovation inputs (Research and Development expenditures) and produce more innovation outputs (patents) that are scientifically more important (citations) and economically more valuable (market value of patents). Investment quality also improves, manifesting in better takeover performance and improvements in firm performance and corporate value. Our results suggest that improved governance can mitigate value destruction in powerful CEO‐managed firms. We take steps to mitigate econometric concerns and ensure our results are robust to various combinations of fixed effects and control variables.
- 6 February 2022
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Empirical Legal Studies
- Vol. 19 (1) , 135-188
Powerful CEOs and Corporate Governance
Excessive CEO power is often regarded as value‐destroying. We use a quasi‐exogenous regulatory shock to analyze whether improved governance helps to channel firms with powerful CEOs toward more value‐enhancing corporate policies. We use the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act and NYSE/NASDAQ listing rules and focus on firms that were required to improve governance. We find that postregulation firms led by powerful CEOs increase innovation inputs (Research and Development expenditures) and produce more innovation outputs (patents) that are scientifically more important (citations) and economically more valuable (market value of patents). Investment quality also improves, manifesting in better takeover performance and improvements in firm performance and corporate value. Our results suggest that improved governance can mitigate value destruction in powerful CEO‐managed firms. We take steps to mitigate econometric concerns and ensure our results are robust to various combinations of fixed effects and control variables.
- 21 December 2021
- Published by Wiley in R&D Management
- Vol. 52 (4) , 768-796
Market dominance, R&D grant funding, and innovation outcomes
Which companies should receive government R&D grants? Should R&D grants go to already dominant firms, whom one would expect to execute fully in innovation spending to produce better outcomes? Or, should grants go to firms that are less dominant and might need the funding for innovation? Using a novel proprietary panel dataset of over 26,000 firm‐year observations for Irish firms with 1,825 winning grants, this paper provides support for a strategic or efficiency effect: market dominance moderates grant innovation outcomes. Specifically, dominant firms significantly outperform other groups in terms of future R&D spending, R&D growth, and overall employment gains. However, they perform worse than other groups with respect to the employment of in‐house R&D workers, suggesting that dominant firms already have significant R&D capabilities. We also show that dominant firms’ future productivity is not statistically different from similar non‐grant backed dominant firms, potentially implying that they use grant money to retain their existing market position, rather than to capitalize on it and increase productivity by more than their peer firms.
- 21 December 2021
- Published by Wiley in R&D Management
- Vol. 52 (4) , 768-796
Market dominance, R&D grant funding, and innovation outcomes
Which companies should receive government R&D grants? Should R&D grants go to already dominant firms, whom one would expect to execute fully in innovation spending to produce better outcomes? Or, should grants go to firms that are less dominant and might need the funding for innovation? Using a novel proprietary panel dataset of over 26,000 firm‐year observations for Irish firms with 1,825 winning grants, this paper provides support for a strategic or efficiency effect: market dominance moderates grant innovation outcomes. Specifically, dominant firms significantly outperform other groups in terms of future R&D spending, R&D growth, and overall employment gains. However, they perform worse than other groups with respect to the employment of in‐house R&D workers, suggesting that dominant firms already have significant R&D capabilities. We also show that dominant firms’ future productivity is not statistically different from similar non‐grant backed dominant firms, potentially implying that they use grant money to retain their existing market position, rather than to capitalize on it and increase productivity by more than their peer firms.
- 1 April 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Banking & Finance
- Vol. 113
Governance, board inattention, and the appointment of overconfident CEOs
- 1 April 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Banking & Finance
- Vol. 113
Governance, board inattention, and the appointment of overconfident CEOs